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Lumley v. Gye 
THE AFTERMATH: AN INDUCEMENT TO 
JUDICIAL REFORM? 
This area of tort is well-traversed and more than adequately described. 
In order to embark on yet another discussion of the cases one needs a 
reason. Mine is that by means of such a discussion I am hopeful of 
demonstrating that the approved processes of judicial law-making are 
unsatisfactory. I will not be concerned to show that individual cases were 
wrongly decided but rather that, by adhering to the principle that all a 
court can do is to interpret the existing state of the law as found in the 
words used by some previous court, the judiciary is bound to bring the 
judicial process into disrepute. Attempts to be true to the notion that 
judges must not decide cases on the basis of social policy criteria but 
must instead decide cases by applying existing formulae to particular fact 
situations Ieads courts to use a strange form of logic in order that accept- 
able decisions can be reached by them while at the same time they cannot 
be accused of overly insulting the sacrosanct principle of precedent and 
consistency. But this distortion of logic1 will create pigeonholes out of 
which a trial judge, bound by the doctrine of a "neutral" application of 
precedent, may iind it hard to escape even though social logic demands 
that he should eschew the effects of the existing formulation of the law. 
The decision in Lumley v. Gye2 and its well-known subsequent history is 
a good illustration of this undesirable aspect of our legal system. 
This article will try to establish that Lumley v. Gye was not the fore- 
runner of a new species of tort liability, but that it was a manifestation of 
* B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), (Melb.), J.D. (Chicago), Barrister and Solicitor (Vic.) ; 
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
1 Judges are by no means unaware that the precedent doctrine may need to be 
"doctored". For instance, in Quinn v. Leathern [1901] A.C. 495, Lord Halsbury 
said at p. 506 
"[Elvery judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or 
assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be 
found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed 
and qualified by the particular facts . . . in which such expressions are to be 
found. . . . [A] case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely 
deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically 
from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical 
code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical - . - 
at all." 
In this article it will be argued that failure to recognize these sentiments as home 
truths leads to difficulties. 
(1853) 2 El.  & B1. 216; 118 E.R. 749. 
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a general cause of action which protected certain interests against inter- 
ference caused by certain kinds of conduct. Further, it will be demonstrated, 
the highly theoretical approach to case law interpretation by the courts 
both causes remedies to be given where they should not be available and 
remedies to be withheld where they should be granted. The value judgment 
inherent in the last point will be spelt out and made the basis for a 
recommendation as to how the courts ought to proceed in the future. 
The plaintiff's declaration to which the defendant demurred in Lumley V. 
Gye contained three counts. Their combined effect was that the plaintiff, 
the proprietor of the Queen's Theatre and Her Majesty's Theatre, had 
engaged Miss Wagner to perform for him and only for hi at his theatres 
for a specified period; that the defendant knew of this arrangement and 
with malicious intent, whilst the agreement between the plaintiff and 
Miss Wagner was in force, wrongfully and maliciously enticed Miss Wagner 
to refuse to sing or perform at the plaintiff's theatres, and to abandon her 
contract with the plaintiff, as a result of which the plaintiff suffered damage. 
I t  was held by the Queen's Bench (Coleridge 3. dissenting) that the 
plaintiff had made out a good cause of action. Although it was a while 
before the full impact of the decision was accepted: it came to be 
regarded as the holding which established the law to be that, if a breach 
of contract was procured by the act of a stranger to the contract, whether 
"malicious" or not, the stranger would be liable to the promisee who had 
been injured by the breach of contract committed by the promisor. Another 
significant facet of the decision was that it seemed that the nature of the 
contract breached was of no relevance provided the conduct of the 
defendant had led directly to the breach. 
The fact situation of Lumley v. Gye was peculiarly unsuited to give 
rise to the creation of a new species of tort as the result did not seem to 
fill in a lacuna in the legal protection for worthwhile rights, making it all 
the more remarkable that it became to be regarded in that way. After all 
what legal and/or social policy which was not already provided for was satis- 
fied by deciding that the plaintiff had a cause of action against the defend- 
ant? The breach of contract by Miss Wagner plainly made her liable to the 
pldntiff. Why should the plaintiff be given an additional remedy? In his 
judgment in Lumley v. Gye Erle J.  suggested that one reason would be 
that the measure of damages in contract might be inadeq~ate.~ But this is 
3 Thus in Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333, some 28 years later the Court of 
Appeal, whilst acknowledging that there was a cause of action for procufing a 
breach of contract (by a majority of two to one) did suggest that a finding of 
"malice" in the defendant was essential to the establishment of the tort. It was 
not until the decision in Temperton v. Russell [I8931 1 Q.B. 715, was handed 
down that the doctrine as set out in the text was fully accepted, 
4 Ibid., 234, 756, 
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not a satisfactory reply. The principle of contract law is that the parties 
have struck a bargain voluntarily. Hence, as the theory is that they do not 
have to enter into a contractual relationship with any particular person, 
they must be taken to have voluntarily taken the risk that, should there be 
a breach of contract, the ensuing loss might not be made good by the party 
in breach. The rationale for giving an additional remedy to the promisee 
who has suffered loss cannot be spelt out from the fact that he cannot 
recoup losses suffered by him when, it must be assumed, he was prepared 
to run the risk of such losses when he entered into the ba rga i~ .~  An 
alternative raison d'2tre for the granting of this remedy must be found. 
Erle J. also relied on a general principle to justify his holding in Lumley 
v. Gye, viz. that 
"the procurement of the violation of the right is a cause of action, and 
that, when this principle is applied to a violation of a right arising 
upon a contract of hiring, the nature of the service contracted for is 
immaterial."6 
Much later the same reason for imposing liability on a stranger to a 
contract was expressed as follows in a much-cited passage of Lord 
MacNaghten's judgment in Quinn v. Leathem : 
"[A] violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, 
and . . . it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual 
relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for the 
interference." 
That is, Lumley v. Gye was seen as but one variant of a general principle. 
Without just yet going into the nature of the kind of right that the law 
will not permit to be violated, it is clear from the above quotations that 
a remedy is granted to the possessor of such a right against violations 
because the law wishes the acknowledged right to be respected and to 
deter would-be violators by punishing actual violators. That is, inherent 
in the cause of action is the notion that certain modes of behaviour are 
not to be condoned and ought to be punished, even though the possessor 
of the right may well have adequate remedies for the losses resulting out 
of the violation of his right. That the tort action can be used to this effect 
is amusingly illustrated by the case of Nash v. C ~ p e l a n d . ~  There the 
5 To the argument that the promisor is not really in default in such circumstances, 
i.e. his conduct is not the real cause of the losses suffered by the promisee, and 
liability for the loss should therefore be imposed on the true procurer or cause of 
the loss, all that needs to be said is that the law does not accept this argument. 
As well as his action against the third party, the promisee can sue the promisor 
even though he would, in the absence of the third party's inducement, have 
performed the contract as required. 
6 Ibid., 232, 755. See also the judgment of Wightman J. in which many instances of 
acbons on the case are given which held that recovery could be had where an 
unjustifiable violation to the plaintiFs interests had been committed, see particu- 
larly 238, 757-8. 
7 [I9011 A.C. 495, 510. 
8 (1887) 4 W.N. (N.S.W.) 41. 
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plaintiff was a barrister-at-law who had bought a ticket entitling him to a 
particular sleeping berth on a train. When he went to this sleeping berth he 
found another man in occupation of it. This man turned out to be the 
Minister for Lands who, having been shown the plaintiff's ticket, refused 
to leave the sIeeping berth "despite the plaintiff's remonstrances". The 
plaintiff sought the help of the train guard who, in reply to the plaintiff's 
questioning said that Mr Copeland had "no ticket for the berth or the 
train; but he's a Minister, and I can't do anything. . . . It is as much as 
my billet is worth to shunt him"? The upshot was that the defendant, in 
strong language, told the plaintiff that he would not give up the berth and 
the plaintiff, his dignity hurt, had to sleep in a less comfortable place on 
the train. The plaintiff clearly had an action against the Commissioner for 
Railways in that there had been a breach by him of the contract between 
him and the plaintiff. But the plaintiff equally clearly was more interested 
in punishing the defendant. In charging the jury the Chief Justice told 
them that the plaintiff's allegations revealed a cause of action for were 
it not so 
"it would be most disastrous to the public generally . . . for you would 
simply be governed by the strongest, and whoever was the strongest 
would prevail. . . . The law is that if a person commits a wrong of that 
sort he is liable to be mulcted in damages for that wrong, and if he 
commits a wrong of that sort under circumstances of insult and contu- 
mely the person so wronged is entitled to exemplary damages."1° 
But the courts do not like to indulge in decision-making on the basis of 
such criteria as the moral depravity or the social uselessness of the 
defendant's conduct when compared to the social merit of the plaintifE's 
activity. For so to do, apart from being devilishly difficult, would force 
them into openly evaluating the moral or social merit of people's behaviour, 
evaluations which cannot readily be made by reference to concrete, 
objective criteria such as breach of an existing contract and the indepen- 
dent illegality of the defendant's conduct. This is not to say that courts 
never have regard and, more importantly, that they never say that they 
do have regard, to such criteria as malevolence, malice, spite, lack of 
goodwill and the like. They do; but where it is at all possible they show 
their preference for being able to find that the applicable law does not 
require them to make value judgments. In the area under discussion they 
have felt themselves enabled to give rein to this preference ever since the 
House of Lords stated that a person may do an act which he is legally per- 
mitted to do, without fear of attracting liability for ensuing loss even if the 
9 Ibid., 41, 42. 
10 Ibid., 43. If it be thought that the plaintiff was motivated to sue in tort because 
he might be better off that way rather than for breach of contract, that is, that 
the measure of damages in contract were not likely to be adequate, note that the 
jury, after a quarter of an hour's consideration, returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff, damages one farthing. 
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act is done with malice.ll From this pronouncement the judiciary extracted 
the proposition that the significance of the cause of action which emerged 
from Lumley v. Gye was that, where the right violated was a contract, the 
nature of the behaviour of the stranger who procured or induced the 
breach of contract did not have to be evaluated: liability would follow if 
the breach was the result of the defendant's conduct, whereas if the right 
interfered with was not a contract, the nature of the defendant's conduct 
might make him liable although mere malice would not. That is, in respect 
of breach of contract a different brand of tort liability had evolved, one in 
which the emphasis was on the existence and breach of a contract. By 
thus recognizing the inducing of a breach of contract as a separate, isolated 
head of tort liability the courts obscured the true reason for liability in 
cases such as Lumley v. Gye and eventually, therefore, were forced into 
unnecessarily awkward positions when faced with analogous cases which 
did not quite fit within the illogically created pigeonhole. 
The view that a contract is the kind of right which will justify the imposi- 
tion of liability upon a stranger should it be breached as a result of that 
stranger's conduct, is supported by the respect that the common law has 
evinced over the centuries for private contract-making. The contract is seen 
as the cornerstone of our individualistic society. The making of contracts 
depends on the ability of free activity of individuals to voluntarily treat 
and to negotiate with each other and to agree to be bound to each other 
on such conditions as they choose. Accordingly, its status should be 
protected by the law wherever possible, thereby promoting these manifes- 
tations of individual freedom and enterprise. Thus, another way of putting 
the argument (used in section I) that the reason for the Lumley v. Gye 
decision was that people such as the defendant in that case ought to be 
inhibited from conducting themselves so as to interfere with important 
rights, is that the ability to indulge in contract-making plays such an 
essential r61e in our society that it must be protected by the law. Hence, 
although in terms of actual losses incurred as a result of a breach of 
contract induced by a stranger, the remedies given by law and equity to 
the promisee against the promisor are all that are notionally required, 
public interest demands that such interference with contract-making be 
11 Allen v. Flood [I8981 A.C. 1 .  This holding was to lead to the drawing of a very 
controversial distinction between the conduct of an individual and that of a 
combination, see Quinn v. Leathern [1901] A.C. 495 and Sorrel1 v. Smith (19251 
A.C. 700. In order to hold the defendants' conduct actionable in those cases, the 
House of Lords not being able (or not wishing to in Quinn v. Leathern) to rely 
on a finding of malice in the defendants, because of the decision in Allen v. Flood, 
characterized combined activity as capable of constituting unlawful conduct in 
circumstances in which similar conduct by an individual would not be so 
characterized. 
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more positively discouraged and, therefore, an additional remedy is given 
to the promisee. Note that this gives this most fundamental of all personally 
created relationship-the contract-the status of a right in rem. Indeed, 
in a very important article, Professor Lauterpacht wrote that the doctrine 
of Lumley v. Gye 
"marks another step in the recognition of the property character of the 
contractual right. And, in as much as it expressly recognizes a right of 
the promisee not only against the promisor but also, in a specific sphere, 
against the whole world, it is not without some effect on the traditional 
distinction between rights ad rem and rights in personam."12 
Thus there may be a good policy reason for treating breaches of a 
contract differently from violations of other rights. But it will be clear 
that if the rationale for this "tort" is to be found in awarding protection to 
a public interest then the results ought to d i e r  when the public interest 
demands differing results; rigid adherence to objective criteria without 
regard for the public interest will lead to absurdities. Accordingly, while 
the courts have never openly resiled from their stated position that where 
a breach of contract is the result of a stranger's act the stranger will be 
liable regardless of the nature of his act, they have in fact been forced to 
acknowledge many exceptions to that rule, suggesting thereby that the 
action known as "inducement of a breach of contract" may not be a new 
or even separate species of tort at all. 
The need for a contract 
McKernan v. Fraser13 is a case which exemplifies the judicial insistence 
on the existence of an enforceable contract before liability can be imposed 
on a defendant who interfered with the plaintiff's interests but who did 
not commit an otherwise unlawful act. In that case Union A had been 
deregistered as an organization under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. 
The plaintiffs had been members of Union A and wished it to be registered 
again. They refused to pay their membership fee until the Union was 
registered again. A rival association had been formed, Union B, which 
the plaintiffs joined. The Adelaide Steamship Company selected eight men, 
including the two plaintiffs, to work one of their ships. Officials of Union A 
told the company that its members would not sail with the plaintiffs, and, 
having spoken to the six members of their Union who had been selected 
at the same time as the plaintiffs, these six men announced that they 
would not sail with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the secretary d 
Union A for, amongst other things, maliciously procuring a breach of their 
contract with the company and, as an alternative, for maliciously coercing 
the company into not entering into contracts with the plaintiffs. The High 
Court found against the plaintiffs on the basis that no contract had been 
12 H. Lauterpacht, "Contracts to Break a Contract" (1936) 52 L.Q.R. 494, 506. 
13 (1931) 46 C.L.R. 343. 
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formed at the time that the company was told by the Union A officials that 
its members would not sail with the plaintiffs. That is, in the absence of 
a contract, something more than an otherwise lawful act causing a plaintiff 
hardship had to be established. The case is particularly striking because it 
was not easy to decide whether or not a contract had been concluded 
between the shipping company and the plaintiffs. 
The casual method of hiring, which was employed in this case, required 
men seeking work to come and make themselves available, creating a pool 
of employees from which the hirer could pick. In this case the company 
had men present their credentials and, when satisfied that certain men met 
their requirements, they asked them to stand on one side. This was the 
acknowledged means of indicating that men had been selected for engage- 
ment by the hirer. The High Court14 held that this picking-up process 
was merely a preliminary to a contract and that, therefore, there could not 
have been a procurement of a breach of contract. But the Supreme Court 
of South Australia (Full Court) had heldz5 that the only bar to holding 
that a contract had been entered into was that there was a statutory 
requirement that articles be signed by every seaman engaged and that 
these articles represented the contract of hire. The South Australian Court 
felt that, as the signing of the articles was, in fact, a mere formality after 
men had been selected following a pick-up, the action of the defendants 
was an actionable procurement of a breach of contract. In the light of 
these facts, the High Court's decision would seem to underline how 
fundamental the prerequisite of the existence of a contract is to the 
founding of the tort. 
In similar vein, the Victorian Supreme Court decided that a trade union 
official was entitled to cause an employer to replace a non-unionist 
employee with a union member. The trade union and the employer had a 
contract which provided that unionists should be given employment in 
preference to non-unionists whenever possible, and the Court accepted 
the trade union official's claim that when he caused the plaintiff non- 
unionist to be replaced by a unionist he was acting lawfully pursuant to 
that agreement. Therefore, the question before the Court was simply 
whether this otherwise lawful act had become actionable at the behest of 
the plaintiff because it had induced a breach of contract. It was held that 
it had not because the plaintiff was employed on an hour to hour basis and 
the employer had the right not to renew the contract after it expired. The 
plaintiff had worked to the end of one day and, when on the next day, a 
unionist was made available the plaintiff was simply not reemployed. In 
14 Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. Gavan Duffy C.J. and Starke J. dissented 
on the basis that the defendants were liable in conspiracy, another allegation of 
the plaintas; they did not concern themselves with the question of whether or 
not a contract had been formed. 
I19301 S.A.S.R. 364. 
194 Monash University Law Review [VOL. 1, MARCH '751 
coming to this decision Madden C.J. stated that a mere interference with a 
reasonable expectation of employment was not sufficient to found a right 
of action.16 
As a final illustration, consider Doust v. Godhehear.17 There, one Bower 
had a contract for the conveyance of post office mail. The plaintiff entered 
into a contract with Bower to take the running of the said mail over from 
him. Bower was at all times in the employ of the defendant. The defendant, 
having come to the conclusion that the plaintiff should not reside in the 
neighbourhood, told Bower that unless he terminated his contract with 
the plaintiff, the defendant would terminate its contract with Bower. Bower 
thereupon dismissed the plaintiff who sued the defendant for procuring this 
breach of contract. It was held that the plaintiff had not made out a 
cause of action because his agreement with Bower was not enforceable as 
a contract. The reason for its non-enforceability was that, as the agreement 
between the plaintiff was to be performed for a period of more than one 
year, it had to be in writing (which it was not) to comply with the Statute 
of Frauds requirements. 
These cases demonstrate how the judiciary's preoccupation with verbal 
formulae rather than with the conceptual underpinning of the law will 
sometimes lead it to make decisions which, although according to the 
legal logic employed may be regarded as eminently sound, are in contradic- 
tion to the aims on which these verbal formulae are postulated. Thus, if 
one of the possible rationales for the existence of the tort of inducement 
of breach of contract is that, by making inducers of a breach liable, such 
conduct will be deterred, thereby preserving the hallowed position of 
contract-making in our society, it is hard to see how a finding against the 
plaintiffs in the cases discussed will aid that desideratum. If a legal 
technicality deprives people of this protection against interference by 
strangers, it is not easy to understand how people will feel encouraged to 
enter into the negotiations and agreements which are part and parcel of 
free contract-making. In as much as people need to be deterred, wilful, 
malicious people will not be deterred by an action which cannot be 
brought against them if their reprehensible tactics are successful in that 
no contract is ever formed. 
Similarly, in as much as the existence of the tort is said to be justified 
because the remedies that the promisee has against the promisor are 
inadequate, Doust v. Godbehear reveals that strict insistence that there 
be an enforceable contract which is broken ere liability can be imposed 
will deny an additional remedy where it is most needed. In a case such as 
that one the promisee will not have an action against the promisor at all.ls 
But let us return to the main theme. 
16 Bond V .  Morris [I9121 V.L.R. 351, 356. 
17 (1925) 28 W.A.L.R. 59. 
18 Contrast the situation in the U.S.A. where the action against the inducer is per- 
mitted in cases like Doust v. Godbehear; see Seitz v. MicheE, 148 Minn. 474, 181 
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McKernan v. Fraser, Bond v. Morris and Doust v. Godbehear suggest 
that the courts have treated Lumley v. Gye as having created a new kind 
of tortious liability, viz. that where the right which a plaintiff claims has 
been violated is a contract, liability will be imposed on the violator even 
though his conduct would not otherwise be held to be tortious. This 
explains the need the courts felt to spell out an enforceable contract in 
those cases. If there is in fact such a separate action one would expect that 
(i) as the results in those cases suggest, there would never be an action 
by a plaintiff against a person like the defendants in those cases 
unless the plaintiff could show that the defendant's conduct had 
induced a breach of an enforceable contract concluded between the 
plaintiff and another; and 
(ii) if the plaintiff could show that his contract with another had been 
breached as a result of a stranger's conduct, the plaintiff would 
automatically have an action in tort against the stranger. 
Neither of these expectations are fulfilled by the court's decisions. 
( 1 )  No contract, but defendant made liable for his otherwise lawful act 
In Ratcliffe v. Evans,lg the plaintiff had, upon his father's death, continued 
to run the business of his father as an engineer and a boilermaker under its 
established name of "Ratcliffe & Sons". The defendant was a newspaper 
publisher who had published a statement to the effect that "Ratcliffe & 
Sons" were no longer in business. It was found as a fact that the defendant 
knew this statement to be false and had published it because he wished to 
damage the plaintiff. The plaintiff praved a general loss of business after 
the publication of the statement although he was unable to prove the loss 
of any particular customers or orders as a result of the publication. It was 
held that, even though the publication did not amount to a defamatory 
statement or libel, the plaintiff should succeed and he received damages. 
The name given to this cause of action is injurious falsehood.20 Comparing 
it to the so-called Lumley v. Gye action, some obvious points can be made. 
The first of these is that there is no insistence that the plaintiff's right 
which has been violated be an enforceable contract. The plaintiff in 
Ratclifle v. Evans recovered because his potential contracts were interfered 
with. Can this be explained away by the fact that in Ratclifle v. Evans the 
defendant's conduct had been reprehensible, whereas it need not be so for 
an action in inducement of breach of contract to succeed? The answer 
is "NO". Although one might condemn the defendant's conduct in 
N.W. 106 (1921); Miles Medical Co. V. I .  D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.S. 373, 31 
Sup. Ct. 376 (1911). 
19 [I8921 2 Q.B. 524. 
20 This was the label attached by Salmond to various causes of action which had as 
their common ingredient the telling by the defendant of a falsehood which 
indirectly caused the plaintiff to suffer damage. The prototype of tbis kind of 
action was slander on title. 
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Ratclifle v. Evans as unworthy of a gentleman, or as having no redeeming 
social intent, the fact remains that the defendant's false statement was in 
itself lawful. In this respect it is on all fours with the defendant's conduct 
which leads to the imposition of liability when it induces a breach of 
contract. What supposedly distinguishes that tort from all other causes of 
action is that the defendant's conduct need not itself be actionable if it 
leads to the breach of an enforceable contract. In the same way, the 
falsehood in Ratclifle v. Evans would not have been actionable unless the 
damage of which the plaintiff complained had ensued. 
Ratclifle v. Evans does not stand alone. Many similar decisions have 
been made. Thus, in Casey v. Arnottn the court accepted that the plaintiff 
who was the owner of a ship had a good cause of action against the 
defendant who by telling people that the ship was unseaworthy had caused 
the ship's crew to refuse to go to sea in her. Consequently a negotiation 
(not a contract) for the sale of the ship by the plaintiff to another fell 
through. Again, when a journalist under the heading "The Poet's Experi- 
ence" wrote rather graphically about the hearing of rappings, footfalls, 
the opening and shutting of doors, and of the noiseless turning of door 
handles in a house in which he stayed and then attributed all these 
phenomena to a ghost, the newspaper proprietors were sued by the owner 
of the house who claimed that his opportunity to rent the house at a good 
rental had been diminished. The plaintiff only failed because he could not 
prove that the article had so damaged him, many previous articles to the 
same effect having been published before.22 In Riding v. Smiths the 
plaints claimed that his business as a grocer and draper had fallen off 
ever since the defendant had stated in public that the plaintiff's wife, who 
assisted in the business, had committed adultery. Although he could not 
prove that a particular contract was breached, it was held that a general 
diminution in business was sufficient to ground a cause of action, even 
though the defendant's statement did not amount to actionable slander. 
Kelly C.B. stated: 
"It appears to me, as to the first point, that if a man states of another, 
who is a trader earning his livelihood by dealing in articles of trade, 
anything, be it what it may, the natural consequences of uttering which 
would be to injure the trade and prevent persons from resorting to the 
21 (1876) 2 C.P.D. 24. 
z2 Barrett v. Associated Newspapers (Limited), (1907) 23 T.L.R. 666. See also 
Manitoba Free Press Co. v. Rachel Miriam Gomez Nagy (1907) 39 S.C.R. 340. 
Other cases of iniurious falsehood include Harprave v. Le Breton (1769) 4 Burr. 
2422; 98 E.R. 269; Hall-Gibbs Mercantile ~ & n c ~  Limited v. ~ i h b s  (1910) 12 
C.L.R. 84. In some of the Australian States, the Defamation Code has made 
imputations which are likely to injure a person in his profession or trade, or 
likely to induce such persons to be shunned, avoided, ridiculed or despised, 
defamatory. This means that statements which at common law would amount to 
injurious falsehoods are statutorily actionable. See J. G. Fleming, The Law o f  
Torts, (4th ed., Sydney: Law Book Co. 1971) p. 422. " (1876) 1 Ex. D. 91. 
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place of business, and it so leads to loss of trade, it is actionable. . . . 
Supposing the statement made not to be slander, but something else 
calculated to injure the shopkeeper in the way of trade, as for instance 
a statement that one of his shopmen was suffering from an infectious 
disease, such as scarlet fever, this would operate to prevent people 
coming to the shop; and whether it be slander or some other statement 
which has the effect I have mentioned, an action can, in my opinion, be 
maintained on the ground that it is a statement made to the public 
which would have the effect of preventing their resorting to the shop 
and buying goods of the owner."24 
The affinity between these cases and the tort of inducement of breach 
of contract is manifest: the act of which the plaintiff complains is, of 
itself, not actionable; it only becomes so if the plaintiff can establish that 
he suffered damage. But if he can establish that, the lack of an enforceable 
contract between him and another is no bar to recovery. The existence of 
this general area of recovery, so conveniently labelled "injurious falsehood", 
does suggest that the cause of action known as an inducement of breach 
of contract is not a newly emerged head of tort liability at all. 
Returning to a point made a little earlier, it could be argued that, as 
injurious falsehood requires that the defendant's conduct be classed as 
malicious,2%e tort is different to the action of inducement of breach of 
contract. But it has already been shown that liability will be imposed under 
the rubric of injurious falsehood even though the defendant's act was 
lawful. Thus to say that the defendant's act must have been done with 
malice appears to add little to the description of the tort. Indeed, in some 
cases it has been held that malice means without just cause or excuse.26 
The sixteenth edition of SalmondZ7 states that the malice required is some 
dishonest or otherwise improper motive possessed by the defendant. For 
this proposition the learned author cites London Ferro-Concrete Co. Ltd. 
v. J ~ s t i c z , ~ ~  which case, in turn, relied upon (amongst other authorities) 
the seventh edition of Salmond as authority for that proposition. In any 
event, it does not seem important whether malice is dehed  as conduct 
without just cause or excuse or as conduct which is improper or dishonest. 
Assume that the latter is the accepted formulation: in what way were the 
defendants' motives in the cases discussed improper or dishonest? Did those 
defendants' acts do any more than reveal that they intended to harm the 
plaintiff and (in some cases) perhaps to gain some advantage for them- 
selves out of causing such harm? And is this not also the motivation which 
has spurred on the defendants in the cases examined who were made 
24 Ibid., 93-4. 
25 Royal Baking Powder Co.  v. Wright, Crossley & Co. (1901) 18 R.P.C. 95. 
26 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright, Crossley & Co.  (1901) 18 R.P.C. 95, Joyce 
v. Motor Surveys [I9481 Ch. 252. 
27 Salmond on the Law of Torts (16th ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell 1973) by 
R. F. V. Heuston, p. 407. 
2s (1951) 68 R.P.C. 261. 
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liable for inducing a breach of contract? Thus, even though malice is said 
to be an essential ingredient of the tort of injurious falsehood, this does 
not serve to differentiate that tort from that of inducing a breach of 
contract. 
Passing-off is another head of tort liability which bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the tort of inducing a breach of contract. There will be an 
action against a person who pretends that "his goods or services are those 
of the plaintiff or associated with him or sponsored by him".29 There are 
many variants of the tort, but a typical example is provided by Sparks v. 
Harper & CO.~O The plaintiff and defendants were both coffee merchants. 
The plaintiff manufactured a special mixture of coffee and chicory, the 
recipe for which was secret. It was marketed in tins which bore the label 
"Finest French Coffee, as prepared and used in the principal towns of 
France-Cafe Parisien. Sole holder of the receipt in Queensland, B. Sparks, 
Brisbane". The tins were coloured red, white and blue. The defendant 
subsequently marketed a brand of coffee in tins coloured red, brown, white 
and blue which looked just like the plaintiff's tins, and the label on which 
prominently included the words "French Coffee". It was held that the 
defendants had wished to deceive the public into thinking that their 
product was that of the plaintiff, that the public was likely to have been 
deceived and the plaintiff would have suffered damage. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff was awarded an injunction restraining the defendants from using 
the name and format of marketing they had used." 
The essence of the tort is that the defendant's conduct would probably 
deceive a pertinent sector of the public and that this is likely to cause the 
plaintiff some damage because his custom will fall off as a consequence of 
29 J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, op. cit. p. 626. Salmond on the Law of  Torts, 
p. 409 sets out the various forms that the tort may assume: 
"(1) A direct statement that the merchandise or business of the defendant is 
that of the plaintiff. 
(2) Trading under a name so closely resembling that of the plaintiff as to be 
mistaken for it by the public. 
(3) elling goods under a trade name already appropriated for goods of that 
lund by the plaintiff, or under any name so similar thereto as to be 
mistaken for it. 
(4) Selling goods with the trademark of the plaintiff or any deceptive 
imitation attached thereto. 
(5) Imitating the get-up or appearance of the plaintiff's goods so as to deceive 
the public." 
30 (1890) 3 Q.L.J. 201. 
31 Other illustrations of this wide-ranging tort are: Lord Byron v. Johnston (1 8 16), 
2 Mer. 29, Routh v. Webster (1847), 10 Beav. 561, 50 E.R. 698. Maxwell v. Hogg 
(1867), L.R. 2 Ch. App. 307, Dixon v. Holden (18&9), L.R. 7 Eq. 488; Day v. 
Brownrigg (1878), 10 Ch. D. 294; Walter v. Ashton [I9021 2 Ch. 282; McCullock 
V. Lewis A. May (Produce Distributors) Ltd. 119471 2 All E.R. 845, Spalding 
Bros. v. Gamage Ltd. (1915) 84 L.J. Ch. 449, Sales AFliates v. Le Jean [I9471 
1 All E.R. 287, Ramsay v. Nicol [I9391 V.L.R. 330; Totalization Agency Board 
v. Turf News [I9671 V.R. 605, Ronson Ltd. v. J. Ronson Ltd. 119571 V.R. 405, 
Henderson v. Radio Corporation (1960) 60 S.R. (N.S.W.) 576. See also generally 
W. L. Morison, "Unfair Competition and Passing-OfF" (1956) 2 Syd. L. Rev. 50 
and J. G. Fleming, The Law of  Torts, op. cit. pp. 626-31. 
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this deception. It is not necessary that the defendant's conduct which 
caused the deception was the result of a fraud practised by the defendant.32 
Thus, once again, conduct is made actionable which would, in the absence 
of this head of tort, not be actionable. Once again, the rights violated are 
not possessed because of the existence of an enforceable contract, suggest- 
ing, once again, that there is no reason to believe that there is a separate 
tort designed to protect contractual relationships. It might be argued that 
as in the passing-off area the defendant's conduct must be likely to deceive, 
it is of such a reprehensible nature that liability ought to be imposed even 
though no contract was breached and that, therefore, one can still say that 
contractual relationships are given protection by tort when other relation- 
ships are not. But, as in injurious falsehood, the reprehensible behaviour of 
the defeodant is not independently unlawful. It has already been seen that 
where the defendant's conduct is such that it amounts to an injurious false- 
hood, there will be actionability whether the interest interfered with was a 
contract or not.33 Now, it transpires that, where there is conduct likely to 
deceive and damage ensues, there will be liability imposed for that conduct 
whether the interest interfered with was a contract or not. Hence the 
potential kinds of acts and modes of conduct against which contracts are 
protected and other interests are not, include one less group, viz. acts and 
conduct calculated to deceive. The three cases used in the previous section, 
McKernan v. Fraser, Bond v. Morris and Doust v. Godbehear are illus- 
trations of the fact that in some situations liability will be imposed for 
conduct which, in the absence of an enforceable contract which was 
breached as a result of such conduct, would be legally excusable. But the 
discussion of the area of injurious falsehood and passing-off suggests that 
such cases might well be explicable on other grounds than that a special 
area of tort liability has been developed to protect the status of contract 
and contractual relations. If indeed, it is true that there is nothing conclusive 
about the existence of a contract or lack thereof, one would expect to 
find that the converse is true, viz. that conduct which induces breaches 
of contract will not necessarily be actionable. 
(ii) Contract breached as a consequence of  the defendant's conduct, but 
defendant not liable 
Liability will not be imposed on a person whose conduct induced a breach 
of contract between two other people unless it was the intention of the 
actor that there should be such a breach of contract. This does not mean, 
as has been noted, that the actor need to have borne the plaintiff spite or 
32 Spalding Bros. v. Gamage Ltd. (1915) 84 L.J. Ch. 449. 
33 Note the case of Petree v. Knox (1917) 17 S.R. (N.S.W.) 505, where it was held 
that a fraudulent misrevresentation which led an employer to lawfully dismiss its 
employee, gave the employee a right of action againsi the misrepresentor if he 
could prove damages. That is, just as the lack of an enforceable contract does not 
bar an action for a false statement leading to economic loss, the existence of an 
enforceable contract, which is not breached, does not erect such a bar, 
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ill-will, but rather that it is required that, in engaging in the conduct 
which induced the breach of conduct, the actor desired this consequence 
to eventuate. Hence, if the most that the plaintiff can show is that he lost 
the benefit of an enforceable contract because of negligent conduct by the 
defendant, there will usually be no actionability. Thus, in La Socie'te' Ano- 
n y m  de Remorquage 6 He'lice v. Bennett~?~ the plaintiffs were the owners 
of a steam tug, which, under contract, was towing a ship when a steamship, 
operated by the defendant, as a result of the operators' negligence, collided 
with and sank the towed ship. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for the 
amount of money lost because the towing contract could not be performed. 
They failed. This decision was, of course, consistent with the principle 
that, in order to recover economic loss caused by the negligence of 
another, a special relationship had to exist between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, or the economic loss had to be associated closely with a physical 
property loss.35 Any expansion on this principle, so it was and still is 
thought, would lead to recovery for losses which spread far and wide 
throughout the community, imposing an unwo~ited burden on individuals, 
and inhibiting desirable enterprises and activities. But where the economic 
loss arising out of the breach of contract is intentionally inflicted, liability 
will often be imposed because such intentional conduct is to be dis- 
couraged. For instance, if in La Socikte' Anonyme v. Bennetts the 
defendant had deliberately rammed the towed ship in order to stop 
the plaintiffs from completing their contract there can be no doubt 
that the plaintiffs would have r e c ~ v e r e d . ~ ~  So far the nature of the 
conduct of the inducer of the breach of the contract has been treated 
as being of little importance in the sense that it has been assumed that if it 
brought about the breach of contract, liability could be imposed regardless 
of its nature. But from the foregoing it is plain that the law, by insisting 
that it must have been the intent of the actor to induce the breach of 
contract, demonstrates that it is concerned with more than whether or not 
a contract was breached; how the breach was engineered is of significance, 
denoting that a judgment is exercised between competing interests, namely 
protection of the contract and freedom of action by the inducer of a breach 
of contract.37 The remainder of this section is concerned with showing how 
the courts have been engaged in making this kind of policy choice. 
34 [I9111 1 K.B. 243. 
35 Cattle V. Stockton Waterworks Co., (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 453; Hedley Byrne & 
Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. 119641 A.C. 465, M.L.C. v. Evatt, 119711 A.C. 
793, Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., 119721 3 
All E.R. 557, S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittall & Son Ltd. 119711 
1 O.B. 337. 
D.-C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, [I9521 Ch. 646, 695, 702. 
Where there is a special relationship between an adviser and the plaintiff, the 
adviser will be liable for the economic loss that the plaintiff will suffer as a result 
of relying on that advice if it was carelessly given. Careless conduct will therefore 
have the same effect as intentional conduct where a relationship "equivalent to 
contract" exists. That is, here too, the law acknowledges that the nature of the 
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If the imposition of liability requires an intention on behalf of the actor 
to induce the breach, it follows that the actor must have known that there 
was a contract between the plaintiff and another. Indeed, LauterpachP8 
argues that the requirement of intent means no more than that the 
defendant should have had knowledge that his conduct would lead to a 
breach of contract between the plaintiff and another. The earlier cases of 
inducement of breach of contract put no onus on the actor to make 
inquiries as to whether or not there were contractual relations with which 
his conduct might interfere. In British Industrial Plastics Ltd. v. F e r g u ~ o n ~ ~  
the plaintiffs had employed D for many years. When D left their employ 
he agreed, by an enforceable contract, not to enter into a business 
concerned with the manufacture and sale of chemicals used in a secret 
process the plaintiffs used. Thereafter D approached the defendant and 
told him that he had knowledge of a process that might be of use to him 
and his company. The defendant was interested but did not want to 
interfere with anyone else's rights, so he sent D to his company's patent 
agents, in the belief that if D's idea was patentable his company could 
then apply for a patent and that ii this was obtained there could be no 
question of unlawfully interfering with a trade secret. The patent agent 
duly informed their clients that the process proposed by D was patentable. 
An application was made by the defendant's company for a patent; the 
plaintiffs sued him and his company for inducing a breach of the contract 
between them and D. The Court of Appeal held that, although the 
defendant's belief that there could be no violation of a trade secret if D's 
process was patentable was stupid, it had been honestly held, and the 
defendant (or his company) could not be fixed with constructive knowledge 
of the existence of the contract he had allegedly induced. Having no 
knowledge, actual or constructive, the defendants could not be made liable. 
Recent decisions, however, have imposed liability after imputing 
knowledge of the terms of an existing contract to the defendants. The 
outstanding pronouncement along these lines is to be found in Lord 
Denning's judgment in Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lo~thian:~O 
conduct is more reprehensible in some circumstances than in others, although the 
damage inflicted by the conduct is identical no matter what the circumstances. For 
instance, although there is much debate about what a special relationship is, 
the overruling of the decision in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [I9511 2 
K.B. 164 in Hedley Byrne v. Heller, ibid., means that, where accounts are prepared 
specifically for a prospective investor, even in the absence of an intentionally false 
statement, or in the absence of an intent to cause loss, the preparer of the accounts 
will be liable to the prospective investor if the preparation was careless and the 
prospective investor invested and lost. But if the accounts were not prepared for a 
specific person, that is, in the absence of a special relationship or fraud (which is 
becoming less restrictively defined) and the same investor lost his money for the 
same reason, there may be no recovery. That social policy considerations-such 
as limiting the area of recovery-give rise to this distinction is clear. 
38 Op. cit. 
39 [I9401 1 All E.R. 479. 
40 [I9661 1 All E.R. 1013, 1017. 
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"The parties . . . had a right to have their contractual relations preserved 
inviolate without unlawful interference by others; . . . If the officers 
of the trade union knowing of the contract deliberately sought to procure 
breach of it, they would do wrong; see Lumley v. Gye. Even if they did 
not know of the actual terms of the contract, but had the means of 
knowledge-which they deliberately disregarded-that would be enough. 
Like the man who turns a blind eye. So here, if the officers deliberately 
sought to get this contract terminated, heedless of its terms, regardless 
whether it was terminated by breach or not, they would do wrong. For 
it is unlawful for a third person to procure a breach of contract 
knowingly, or recklessly, indifferent whether it is a breach or not." 
This attitude widens the ambit of protection for contractual relationships. 
In J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley41 it was held that, as the defendants 
knew that barges were always returned promptljr on the completion of the 
job for which they were hired, "it must have been obvious to them that 
this was done under contracts between the appellants and the large 
hirers".42 The requirement of intent for the application of the principle of 
Lumley v. Gye was therefore held to be satisfied. In that case the defend- 
ants were unionists and it can readily be seen how this extension of 
liability-by imputing knowledge to a defendant and thus satisfying the 
intent requirement--could be disastrous for trade unions. Every time that 
a trade union causes its members to strike it is likely that there will be an 
interference with the performance of contracts by the struck employer. 
That, like the defendants in Stratford v. Lindley, they must know of the 
existence of such contracts although not of their precise terms, is self- 
evident. And if one need not know of the exact terms of the contract, 
liability should be imposed on the trade union (and its striking members) 
if a promisee of the struck employer sues it (and them) for inducing a 
breach of contract.* The potential danger this presents to trade unions is 
well-illustrated by a fact situation suggested by the case of Director of 
Posts and Telegraphs v. A b b ~ t t . ~ ~  There a lawyer had applied to have a 
telephone installed in new offices he was to occupy on a certain date. He 
had advised the Posts and Telegraphs offices of the special need he had 
4 1  [I9651 A.C. 269. 
42 Per Lord Reid, at 323. 
43 Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins 119691 1 All E.R. 522 is a dramatic illustration 
of how the English courts have come to impute knowledge to defendants ~n 
inducing breach of contract cases, whether or not the defendants have any actual 
knowledge of the provisions of the contract. There a unlon hav~ng some Idea that 
there was a contract between the plaintiffs and an oil company under which the 
oil company would supply fuel to the plaintiffs, took action to stop such supp!y. 
It was held that the unionists were liable for interfering with the contract desplte 
the fact that there was no breach of contract. There was no breach because the 
contract, unbeknown to the unionists, had a force majeure clause which relieved 
the oil company from the obligation of supplying fuel if a labour dispute should 
make it impossible to do so. The mere fact that the defendants intended that a 
breach of contract be induced was sufficient to found liability, even though the 
defendants had no way of knowing whether their conduct would cause a breach. 
*4 [I9741 2 A.L.R. 62.5. 
Lumley v. Gye-The Aftermath 203 
to have the telephone available from the very first day of his occupation 
of his new offices, telling them that, if they could not guarantee installation 
by the date scheduled for the opening of his new offices, he would delay 
the date of such opening to a day on which they could guarantee installa- 
tion. The Posts and Telegraphs people assured the lawyer that he would 
have his telephone on the required date. In fact they failed to install the 
telephone on that day because of a strike called by their employees. These 
employees had no particular knowledge of the lawyer's dealings with their 
employer, nor of their employer's acquiescence to his request. The 
Supreme Court of South Australia held that there had been no binding 
contract between the Posts and Telegraphs offices and the lawyer; but let 
us assume that there had been such an enforceable contract: could the 
strikers be made liable to the lawyer for inducing a breach of that contract? 
If the doctrine of "turning a blind eye" were taken to its logical conclusion, 
liability ought to follow. Such a result would seriously inhibit trade union 
activity and, unsurprisingly, the courts have indicated that they will 
attempt to lessen the impact which would result from taking the doctrine 
to its logical conclusion. In Torquay v. Cousins Lord Denning M.R. 
clearly saw the perils for trade unionism if he mathematically were to apply 
the "turning a blind eye" principle: 45 
"A trade union official, who calls a strike on proper notice, may well 
know that it will prevent the employers from performing their contracts 
to deliver goods, but he is not liable in damages for calling it. Indirect 
interference is only unlawful if unlawful means are used. . . . This 
distinction [between direct and indirect interferences] must be main- 
tained, else we should take away the right to strike altogether. Nearly 
every trade union official who calls a strike . . . knows that it may 
prevent the employers from performing their contracts. He may be 
taken even to intend it. Yet no one has supposed hitherto that it was 
unlawful; and we should not render it unlawful today." 
Here we have a straight-forward expression by Lord Denning that even 
though the defendant intended to induce a breach of a contract the 
existence and general terms of which he will be assumed to have known, 
he will not be liable if his conduct did not directly induce such a breach 
and was not otherwise unlawful. Although the intended result of the 
defendant's conduct is the same as in Lumley v. Gye itself there is to be 
no liability. As the violated contract in the excepted situation is just as 
valid and just as socially valuable (presumably) as the one in Lumley v. 
Gye, the distinction between the cases lies in the merit of the defendant's 
conduct. The social policy consideration offered by Lord Denning in the 
45 [I9691 1 All E.R. 522, 530. The reference to calling a strike on proper notice is 
a reference to the situation which arose in Morgan v. Fry 119681 2 Q.B. 710, 
where such notice having been given, it was held that the ensuing strike was not 
unlawful. This point will be adverted to below. 
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passage quoted is clear proof that the courts mill not automatically make 
a defendant liable because he intentionally, that is, with actual or imputed 
knowledge of the contract and the effect of his conduct on it, procures a 
breach of a contract. To clinch the argument, note that the qualification or 
liability for indirectly inducing a breach of contract was not just a reaction 
necessitated by the unwarranted increase in the ambit of the tort by the 
decision in Emerald Constructions v. Lowthian. Long before the holding 
there that knowledge of a contract and its terms could be imputed to the 
defendant, it had been authoritatively held that indirectly inducing a breach 
of contract was not actionable unless the defendant's conduct was 
independently unlawful; at that time it was also held that the defendant 
must also have had actual knowledge of the contract whose breach he 
induced.46 The effect of removing both these limitations-which arose out 
of policy considerations-gave rise to the fear Lord Denning expressed. 
There are other situations where there is both an intent to induce a 
breach of contract and an ensuing breach of contract where no liability is 
imposed on the person who induced the breach. Thus, the defendant will 
be held not liable if he merely induced a breach of contract because the 
promisor could not perform his part of the bargain without breaching a 
prior contract that he had made with the defendant.47 If the rationale 
underlying inducing a breach of contract as a cause of action in tort is the 
protection of private contract-making, it is easy to see why the defendant's 
conduct is not actionable in cases like this. Note that the second innocent 
promisee will have an action for breach of contract against the common 
promisor, because the second contract was, by definition, an enforceable 
contract. If the enforceability of the first contract is deemed to be worthy 
of protection to the extent that the promisee to that contract may defend 
it by conduct which in another would be tortious, it ought to follow that it 
would be sufficiently worthy of protection where the second promisee knew 
of the prior contract and its inconsistence with his own, yet still sought 
to have the second contract performed. But what will be the situation 
where the second promisee enters into the second contract without 
knowledge of the first and, having acquired such knowledge, continues to 
perform the second contract? In Thomson v. Deakin Jenkins L.J. thought 
such a person would have committed an actionable interferen~e.~~ But a 
recent Victorian case shows, once again, that the principle of protecting 
validly made contracts against intentional interference is by no means 
immutable. 
In H. C. Sleigh Ltd. v. the plaintiff was an oil company who 
had made an agreement with the Blights, proprietors of a service station, 
46 Thomson v. Deakin [I9521 Ch. 646. 
47 Smithies v. National Associafion o f  Operative Plasterers [I9091 1 K.B. 310, 337. 
48 119521 Ch. 646, 694. * [I9691 V.R. 931, 
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under which the plaintiff was to supply the Blights with fuel products. 
The Blights agreed to buy their total requirements in fuel products from 
the plaintiff and not to sell anyone else's products during the term of the 
agreement. They further agreed not to assign their interest in the service 
station during the continuance of the agreement to any but an assignee 
approved of by the plaintiff. In breach of this agreement the Blights 
entered into a contract for sale of their business to the Bishops. It was a 
sixty-day contract. Prior to the execution of the contract, the would-be 
purchasers obtained from the Blights a written statement to the effect that 
the Blights had at no time entered into an agreement with an oil company. 
The contract was then signed and a deposit paid. Before the balance of the 
purchase money was to be paid, the plaintiff oil company heard of the 
purported sale and informed the Bishops of the existence of the plaintiff's 
agreement with the Blights. The Bishops nonetheless completed the con- 
tract. Amongst other actions, an action was brought against them by the 
plaintiff oil company for wrongful interference with the plaintiff's con- 
tractual rights. Adam J. held that the plaintiff should fail. He could see 
no reason why the defendant should give up the benefit of his innocently 
obtained contract, even thought that contract was voidable at the behest 
of the defendant when he was informed of the Blights agreement with 
the plaintiff; that is, because of the misrepresentation made to them, the 
Bishops could at that time have refused to complete and have their deposit 
reimbursed. This is yet another case, then, in which a breach of contract 
was intentionally induced by the defendant but in which the defendant was 
not made liable. 
Sometimes the very nature of the contract breached will prevent the 
inducer of the breach from being made responsible for the breach. The 
standard illustration is breach of a contract of promise to marry. Where 
a father induces his impressionable daughter to break such a contract, it 
has been suggested that the father will not be liable in tort to the disap- 
pointed promisee because "the father's justification arises from a moral 
duty to urge [his daughter] that the contract should be rep~diated".~~ The 
policy consideration which prevents a defendant of this kind from being 
sued in tort is manifest. Note that Viscount Simon envisaged a situation in 
which the disappointed promisee is a "scoundrel". Presumably the defence 
of justification would be available whether or not the promisee was in fact 
a scoundrel (or even if the advice was given to a son rather than a 
daughter), as long as the adviser had an honest belief that he had good 
reason to advise his child to break a contract of a promise to marry. 
In any event, it is clear that the merit of the defendant's conduct is 
to be taken into account for this kind of conduct to be rendered non- 
actionable. This is a marked departure from the stated judicial position 
50 Crofter Handwoven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch [I9421 A.C. 435; per Viscount 
Simon L.C. at 443. 
Monash University Law Review [VOL. 1, MARCH '751 
in respect of the contractual relationships so far examined. It may well be 
that the defence of justification should also be available where relationships 
analogous to those of parent-child are involved; for instance, where a 
medical practioner advises a patient who has entered into a contract that 
he should not perform the contract and thereby induces a breach, or a 
solicitor who advises his client to break an existing contract and pay the 
damages rather than go on with an unfortunately struck bargain. If courts 
are permitted to look at the moral worth of the defendant's conduct, the 
medical and legal advisers in these examples ought to be free to induce 
breaches of contracts when they act in good faith. But the reluctance of 
the courts to indulge in this kind of value judgment-making is manifested 
by the fact that there are very few cases in which they have actually held 
that the defendant's conduct, even though plainly engaged in with the most 
worthy of motives, was not actionable by a promisee to the contract which 
had been breached as a result of the defendant's conduct. 
Thus, in Camden Nominees, Limited v. For~ey ,~ l  the chairman and 
secretary of a tenants' association were held liable for inducing breaches 
of contract between tenants and the landlord. The association had been 
specifically formed with the object of forcing the landlord to abide by his 
obligations under the tenancy agreements, in particular the cleaning of 
passages and stairways and the provision of heating. When the landlord 
refused to co-operate, the chairman and secretary of the association 
counselled other tenants not to pay their rent. The motive of the association 
might well be considered laudable, nonetheless the defendants were held 
liable. South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal C O . ~ ~  is probably 
the low watermark for the availability of justification as a defence. There 
the miner's union had called planned "stop-days" during the year. These 
were in breach of the miners' contracts of employment. The union had 
called the "stop-days" because it feared that the activities of merchants 
and middlemen would bring down the price of coal and, therefore, its 
members' wage rates. There was no animosity towards the employers, or 
a dispute with them. Indeed, the union believed that it was also acting in 
the best interests of the colliery-owning employers. The House of Lords 
accepted that the unionists acted without any spite or ill-will, and truly 
to protect the interests of their members and, to a lesser extent, of the 
employers. Nonetheless, the advice which led to the breaches of contract 
was held to be an actionable indu~ement.~ 
Brimelow v. C a ~ s o n ~ ~  is d rare instance of a case in which the motive of 
51 [I9401 Ch. 352. 
52 [I9051 A.C. 239. 
53 This result is probably based on the same notion which caused Porter J. to say 
that "the justification must, I think, involve an action taken as a duty, not the 
mere protection of the defendants' own interests" in De Ierley Marks v. Green- 
wood (Lord) [I9361 1 All E.R. 863, 873. 
b4 119241 1 Ch. 302. 
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the defendant was recognized as justifying his conduct which induced a 
breach of contract. There the plaintiff was a theatre manager who paid 
his chorus girls less than the minimum wage an actors' union had pre- 
scribed. A committee representing theatrical employees wished to stop this 
behaviour and induced theatre owners who had entered into contracts 
with the plaintiff to have the plaintiff's company perform at their theatre 
to break such contracts and induced others who might enter into such 
contracts with him not to do so. It was held that this committee could 
not be made liable to the plaintiff. The Court was moved to this holding 
by the fact that at least one chorus girl of only eighteen years of age had 
been forced, because of her poor wages, to live "in immorality" with 
another member of the company. The impact of this on the Court was 
not lessened by the fact that the man she lived with "in immorality" was 
"a tiny, deformed creature, a dwarf" who "was an abnormal man".55 
Apart from this case, there are no other instances where the courts have 
held that the conduct of the defendant was so morally worthwhile that 
the breach of contract it induced did not make the defendant liable. 
One other kind of situation in which the defendant's acts lead to a 
breach of contract, yet does not make him liable, is noteworthy. James v. 
The Cornmon~ealth~~ presented the circumstances very well. There it was 
alleged by the plaintiff that common carriers, who had a common law duty 
to carry his goods, had refused to do so because they were afraid that a 
Commonwealth Department might seize the goods and, as the officers of 
that Department had intimated to the carriers, that they would be prosecuted 
under the existing law. Such provisions of law did exist at the time of 
these intimations, but when challenged, they were held to have been part 
of unconstitutionally enacted law, and, therefore, invalid.57 The High Court 
held, in the words of Dixon J.: 
"An intention to put the law in motion cannot be considered a wrongful 
procurement or inducement, simply because it turns out that the legal 
position maintained was ill-founded."58 
His Honour did point out that the Commonwealth officers' belief in the 
validity of the law they were invoking must have been bona fide. 
It is clear that this case is yet another illustration of the judiciary's 
desire to protect some modes of behaviour at the expense of the hallowed 
private contract. After all, the tort of inducing a breach of contract is 
supposedly made out if the intentional act of the defendant led to the 
breach of contract of which the plaintiff complains.* The words chosen by 
55 Ibid.. 305. 
56 (1939) 62 C.L.R. 339. 
57 James v. The Commonwealth, (1936) A.C. 578; 55 C.L.R.I. 
58 62 C.L.R. 339, 373. 
59 The High Court treated the "Lumley v. Gye tort" as being applicable to inter- 
ferences with the carrying out of public duties as well as to contractual relation- 
ships. 
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Dixon J. in the passage quoted are, if that is the true position, misleading 
in that they hint (although His Honour probably did not intend them to) 
that there must be something "wrongful" about the defendant's act. That, 
it has been noted, is only necessary where there is an indirect inducement 
of a breach of contract. The nature of the defendant's conduct does not 
matter where the inducement is directly effective; all that is needed is the 
causing of the breach with knowledge of the contract. But, if the nature of 
the defendant's conduct is to be weighed against the interests of the 
plaintiff in some cases, (as seems to have been the case in James v. The 
Commonwealth and other cases discussed in this section) it can be posited 
that, even though there are very few decisions to support this tenet, the 
courts have never truly accepted the view that the limitations which 
restrict the area of recovery when rights other than contracts are infringed 
do not also apply to cases of inducement of breach of contract. All that 
can be said is that where the interest interfered with is an enforceable 
contract it is much easier to establish that a tort has been committed than 
if there was no such contract. 
111 
Lumley v. Gye was eventually seen as creating a new area of torts liability 
because the decision itself was seen as an enlargement of a peculiarly 
narrow head of tort liability, namely, liability for causing a breach of a 
contract of service. And the development of this tort was, in turn, 
regarded as being based on a false premise. Thus Sayrem describes how in 
the &st place a master had an action if his servant was interfered with 
because this was meddling with the property of the master and, therefore, 
a personal offence was committed against the master; but, the narrative 
goes on, the master was given an action only if he lost the services of 
his servant as a result of violence being used against the servant. The next 
major development that Sayre notices is the passing of the Ordinance of 
Labourers in 1349. Its purpose was to ensure the availability of labour 
which had become a rare commodity after the Great Plague. The statute 
made it an offence to entice servants away from another's employ. This 
was an enlargement of the existing common law remedy for the loss of a 
servant's services due to a violent attack upon him. The two remedies 
"were swept into the capacious maw of the action on the casewa and by 
the time Lumley v. Gye came to be decided, it was an actionable wrong 
to entice away a servant from his employ. Lumley v. Gye was a major 
new departure because Miss Wagner was not engaged under a contract 
of service by the plaintiff." This was regarded as a dramatic break- 
through, one which could well lead to liability in circumstances where 
F. B. Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract" (1922-1923) 36 Harv. L.R. 663. 
61 Ibid., 666. 
62 For a very thorough description of this interesting history see the judgment of 
Coleridge J. in LurnZey v. Gye. 
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the common law had never imposed it. As late as 1896 Rigby L.J. thought 
that Lumley v. Gye should not be read as giving a right to sue to every 
promisee to a contract whose breach had been induced by a third party: 
"[Ilt is not, as I understand the law, every procuring of a breach of 
contract that will give a right of action. The nature of the contract 
broken must be ~onsidered."~~ 
Other courts, however, did not see anything remarkable or objection- 
able in this "development" of the law. As we have seen,64 Lord MacNaghten 
in Quinn v. Leathem thought that the gist of the action in Lumley v. Gye 
was the accepted principle that to knowingly cause a violation of another's 
right was an actionable wrong and that a contract was such a right which 
could not be violated. Prior to that, in Bowen v. Ha11,6Vt was held that 
the action in Lumley v. Gye was merely a particular application of the 
principle laid down in Ashby v. White.66 That principle was that, whenever 
a person did an act which in law and in fact was a wrongful one and 
which had as its natural consequence the infliction of injury on another, 
the act would result in the imposition of liability. In Lumley v. Gye the 
act of the defendant had been wrongful (and therefore attracted liability) 
because it had been malicious, although not against the law. In Temperton 
v. Ru~sell,6~ the Court of Appeal thought not only that contractual interests 
would be protected by giving a cause of action against a third party who 
interfered with them, but also that to maliciously induce people not to enter 
into contractual relationships with the plaintiff should be actionable. 
Then came Allen v. Flood.68 There it was held by the House of Lords 
that to do an act which was lawful and which caused another person to 
be injured did not render the actor liable to the injured person, even if 
the act which inflicted the injury was done with malice. To be actionable 
the conduct must have been unlawful and the injury must have been one 
to a recognized right. In relation to the area of actionability under discus- 
sion these general principles were held to have the following applications: 
(i) An act which induced another to break a contract was actionable; 
it followed that such an act was regarded as unlawful regardless of 
the motivation of the actor; and 
(ii) whereas an induced breach of contract was the kind of injury for 
which redress could be had in torts, inducing persons not to enter 
into contracts with the plaintiff was not. 
The result was that the ambit of actionability was both enlarged and 
restricted. It meant that, once and for all, it had been established that 
63 Exchange Telegraph Company Limited V. Gregory & Co. [I8961 1 Q.B. 147, 157. 
Supra fn. 7. 
65 (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333. 
66 (1703) 1 E.R. 417. 
67 [I8931 1 Q.B. 715. 
88 [I8981 A.C. 1.  
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direct inducement of a breach of contract was actionable without more. 
No questions of the nature of the inducement or of the contract broken 
were to be of importance. At the same time, the House of Lords drew a 
distinction between breach of contract and other related violations of 
interests. Both Bowen v. Hall, which emphasized the element of malice, 
and Temperton v. Russell, which equated inducing breaches of contract 
with inducements not to enter into contract were, therefore, held to be 
wrong. That is, the notion that Lumley v. Gye was but one aspect of 
general liability principles was denied. It was inevitable, therefore, that 
courts, after Allen v. Flood, would view the decision in Lumley v. Gye, 
the result in which had not been called into doubt by the House of Lords, 
as a case which established that an inducement of a breach of contract 
was an actionable tort in its own right to which the qualifications and 
limitations pertinent to related areas did not apply. 
Yet the holding in Allen v. Flood does not deserve the respect that it 
has sometimes been accorded. After all, at trial level, the judge found for 
the plaintiffs who had been dismissed-without breach of contract-as a 
result of the malicious conduct of the defendant, which had been intended 
to have the plaintiffs dismissed and to prevent them being re-engaged. The 
three Court of Appeal judges found the defendant liable for violating 
both these interests. In the House of Lords, six of the nine judges found 
for the defendant on the basis set out above. Of eight other judges who 
had heard the argument in the House of Lords after being summoned 
to attend, only two wrote opinions in favour of the defendant. Thus, of 
the twenty-one judges who wrote opinions, thirteen found for the plaintiffs 
and only eight for the defendant.69 
At the very least, it is warrantable to pose the question whether the 
judicial pronouncements of the majority of the House of Lords in Allen 
v. Flood should have been treated as if they were precise commandments 
in the nature of unambiguous legislative provisions. That they have been 
accorded this treatment is possibly due to the elaborate judicial consider- 
ation that was given to the case which, consequently, gave the majority 
opinion more status than it might otherwise have received. The head- 
counting exercise engaged in above suggests that this is not a good reason. 
Another reason might be the emphatic language used by members of the 
majority. In this light, note one of the most frequently quoted passages of 
this much-quoted decision. Lord Herschell had noted that in Temperton v. 
69 The trial judge was Kennedy L.J. The Court of Appeal judges were Lord Esher 
M.R., Lopes and Rigby L.JJ.; [I8951 2 Q.B. 21. The House of Lords judges who 
found in favour of the defendant were Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, 
Shand, Davey, James of Hereford; the three judges in the House of Lords who 
found for the plaintiffs were Lord Halsbury L.C., Lords Ashbourne and Morris. 
Of the additional judges, Wright and Mathew JJ. found for the defendant; 
Hawkins, Cave, North, Wills, Grantham and Lawrence JJ. found for the 
plaintiffs. 
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Russell it was thought that, if inducing a breach of contract was action- 
able, then an inducement not to enter into a contract should be actionable. 
His Lordship then stated: 
"It seems to have been regarded as only a small step from the one 
decision to the other, and it was said that there seemed to be no good 
reason why, if an action lay for maliciously inducing a breach of 
contract, it should not equally lie for maliciously inducing a person not to 
enter into a contract. So far from thinking it a small step from the one 
decision to the other, I think there is a chasm between them. The reason 
for a distinction between [them] appears to me to be this: that in the 
one case the act procured was the violation of a legal right, for which 
the person doing the act which injured the plaintiff could be sued as well 
as the person who procured it, whilst in the other case no legal right was 
violated by the person who did the act from which the plaintiff suffered: 
he would not be liable to be sued in respect of the act done, whilst the 
person who induced him to do the act would be liable to an action."70 
It is pertinent to ask whether the law had always recognized the chasm 
whose existence Lord Herschell found so self-evident. 
It has already been seen that the old action of slander or disparagement 
on title has spawned causes of action in injurious falsehood which give 
recovery for violation of interests other than enforceable contractual ones, 
even though the injury-inflicting acts are not, in the absence of the injury, 
unlawful. This suggests that these causes of action are of the same genus 
as the action which, in Allen v. Flood, was thought to be peculiarly 
associated with direct interference with contractual relationships. This 
genus could be that a wrongful interference which resulted in injury was 
always actionable, and that "wrongful" for these purposes did not require 
independent unlawfulness but had to have, at the least, a quality which 
was referred to as "malicen. Lord Halsbury L.C. in Allen v. Flood, after 
an exhaustive review of the cases formed the opinion (that twelve other 
judges may be assumed to have shared) that 
"in denying these plaintiffs a remedy we are departing from the 
principles which have hitherto guided our Courts in the preservation of 
individual liberty to all. I am encouraged, however, by the consideration 
that the adverse views appear to me to overrule the views of most 
distinguished judges, going back now for certainly 200 years, and that 
up to the period when this case reached your Lordships' House there 
was a unanimous consensus of ~p in ion . "~  
70 [l898] A.C. 1, 121. The distinction between an enforceable and a non-enforceable 
right Lord Herschell drew is easy to understand. But note that if this is a distinc- 
tion which supports the tort of inducing a breach of contract it removes one of 
the possible rationales for the cause of action hypothesised at the commencement 
of this article. If the plaintiff recovers from the defendant because he can also 
recover against another person, lack of an adequate remedy can hardly be the 
reason for the existence of the tort. 
71 118981 A.C. 1, 90. 
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Keeble v. Hi~keringill~~ was most heavily relied upon by Lord Halsbury. 
There the plaintiff who kept decoy ducks in his pond in order to trap 
ducks for profit was permitted to recover damages against a neighbour 
who had allegedly frightened away his prey by letting off a shotgun. 
Holt C.J. held that "when a violent or malicious act is done to a man's 
occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood; there an action lies 
in all cases".73 The case law relied on by Holt C.J. for this principle 
(which did not differentiate between existing contractual relationships and 
potential contractual relationships, between interference with such relations 
and actual breaches of contract, and which did not state that malicious 
acts had to be breaches of the law in some independent way) included the 
Gloucester schoolmasters' case.74 Holt C.J. suggested that if a rival of an 
existing school kept prospective students away from that school by 
frightening them by shooting, the existing school's owners would have an 
action against the rival. Such a fact situation did arise in Tarleton v. 
M ' G a ~ l e y ~ ~  and recovery was allowed, as Holt C.J. had predicted. And 
note that the High Court of Australia, after a careful review of the history 
of the cases, some two hundred and sixty years ;i£ter Holt's C.J. pronounce- 
ment said: 
"[Ilt appears that the authorities cited do justify a proposition that, 
independently of trespass, negligence or nuisance but by an action for 
damages upon the case, a person who suffers harm or loss as the 
inevitable consequences of the unlawful, intentional and positive acts of 
another is entitled to recover damages from that other."76 
This decision has been widely discussed and criticized. The major 
criticism has been that, the way the High Court framed its proposition, the 
decision meant that whether or not a defendant intended to injure the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff would recover and that this was akin to creating a 
strict liability principle of actionability for too wide a range of injuries.77 
But if one reads "intention" as meaning "done with knowledge", in the 
Emerald Construction v. Lowthian sense, it is perhaps, not too large a leap 
to go on and say that intention as used by the High Court is in reality a 
modern version of malice as used by Holt C.J. in Keeble v. Hickeringill; 
when that is done, the principle enunciated by the High Court in 1966 is 
the same as the one propounded in the 1706 case. The point will not be 
taken further here; it suffices to note that the High Court's review of the 
cases did lead it to the conclusion that the action upon the case was, at one 
72 (1706) 103 E.R. 1127. 
73 Ibid., 1128. 
74 29 E. 3, 18. 
75 (1794) 170 E.R. 153. 
76 Beaudesert Shire Council v. Smith, (1966) 120 C.L.R. 145, 156. 
77 See G. Dworkin & A. Harari, "The Beaudesert Decision-Raising the Ghost of the 
Actionupon the Case" (1966-1967) 40 A.L.J. 296, 347, 348. See also, G. Dworkin, 
"Intenhonally Causing Economic Loss-Beaudesert Shire Council v. Smith 
Revisited" (1974) 1 Mon. L.R. 4. 
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point of time, large enough to encompass injuries suffered wherever 
"intentional" interference with an enforceable contract or another recognized 
(but not necessarily enforceable) interest occurred. With that in mind, let 
us return to the case of Lumley v. Gye. 
Two cases relied on by the majority in Lumley v. Gye are of some 
interest. The first is Green v. Button.78 There the defendant claimed that 
he had a lien on goods that the plaintiff had contracted to receive from a 
third person. As a result of this claim, which had been "maliciously and 
wrongfully" made, the third person broke his contract with the plaintiff 
and did not deliver the goods. The plaintiff was held to have a good cause 
of action against the defendant. This case could be classed as a slander 
or disparagement on title type case and if the point made is that those cases 
form a very special category of liability rather than being manifestations of 
a general cause of action such as action on the case, Green v. Button does 
not advance the advocated argument much. But note that the majority 
in Lumley v. Gye which, after all, held that to maliciously procure a breach 
of contract was an actionable wrong, relied upon this case as authority for 
that widely stated principle. The second case is Winsmore v. G r e e n b ~ n k . ~ ~  
There the plaintiff complained that his wife had left him and that this was 
unlawful; further, that the defendant had enticed her to so stay away from 
her husband and had harboured her secretly; and that, as a result, the 
plaintiff had lost the benefit and advantage of a large estate that the wife 
had inherited while she was away from her husband. Willis C.J. agreed 
that the loss of the comfort and assistance of his wife was the result of 
the wife's unlawful act but went on to hold that this would not mean that 
the plaintiff could maintain an action against the defendant unless the 
defendant's action could also be classified as unlawful. He then went on to 
say that if "the defendant persuaded the plaintiff's wife to do an unlawful 
act, it was unlawful in the defendant".80 This was relied on in Lumley v. 
Gye where the unlawful act of the wife in Winsmore v. Greenbank was 
equated with Miss Wagner's breach of contract. There was no thought that 
liability should be restricted to cases where the conduct of the defendant 
was independently unlawful or that there was a restricted number of 
interests which would be protected against interference by a stranger. For 
instance, Wightman J. a member of the majority in Lumley v. Gye, opined 
that "upon the authority of the two cases referred to, of Green v. Button 
and Winsmore v. Greeenbank, as well as upon general principles, that an 
action on the case is maintainable".81 
Thus, despite the conclusions to which the views expressed by the 
majority in Allen v. Flood pointed, there are more than sac ien t  strands 
79 (1745) 125 E.R. 1330. 
80 125 E.R. 1330, 1333. 
118 E.R. 749, 757, 
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of authority to suggest that inducing a breach of contract was but a species 
of a general cause of action. It is suggested that the gist of this cause of 
action was that unlawful conduct leading to injury was to be actionable, 
as well as lawful conduct which interfered with a certain number of 
interests. That is, it was one whose essence was a balancing of interest 
against interest and/or interest against conduct. The question that has to 
be put is whether a reasonable formulation of this balancing test can be 
devised for the judiciary's use in modern times and, if this can be done, 
whether it would be advisable to have the courts openly apply such a 
balancing test. 
The guidelines to be provided hereunder are framed on the basis that our 
society wishes the law to uphold the free enterprise creed in as much as it 
does not conflict with other known social objectives. The thesis of this 
section is that, in effect, the courts have already employed this underlying 
philosophy, but that because they have not done so openly or consciously, 
they have created anomalies in the state of the law and have caused 
lawyers to lose faith in the system of technical precedent as well as caused 
certain sections of the community to be cynical about the law's ability to 
achieve justice. 
The starting point for the suggested guidelines is that interference with 
commercial relationships will be actionable if license to interfere with 
them would detract from the ability of free enterprise to flourish. The 
question of liability can, therefore, not be determined by drawing artificial 
distinctions between the interests violated on the basis that these interests 
are or are not enforceable as contracts. Free enterprise is promoted by 
giving as many people as possible as much opportunity as possible of 
entering into business relationships with one another. Thus an interference 
with such an opportunity might well give rise to a cause of action. 
On the other hand, free enterprise is not just seen as a means to 
maximize productivity and efficiency. At its core is the notion that, by 
holding out the carrot to each individual that if he uses his initiative he will 
be rewarded, the development and freedom of the individual will be 
enhanced. This means that the right to engage in commerce with whomever 
one likes about whatever one chooses has, according to this theory, as its 
corollary, the right not to engage in commerce with particular people or 
about particular subjects of commerce. Inevitably, then, there will be 
conflicts arising when one group of people claim that they have a right to 
engage in certain conduct and others claim that they have a right not to 
be forced to engage in that conduct with the first claimants, or that they 
have an equal right to that of the claimants in obtaining rewards for such 
conduct and should, therefore, be permitted to prevent the claimants from 
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engaging in the said conduct. In the face of such disputes, the aim of 
promoting free enterprise makes it permissible and logical for the courts to 
make their decision between the rival claims on the basis of whether or not 
one claimant already had a right recognized by the law as an enforceable 
right. Thus, if A, an employee of B, induces B to dismiss C in breach of 
C's contract of employment with B, because A wishes to exercise his "free 
enterprise" right not to work with C, it is reasonable for a court to say 
that C has an action against A because his contractual right was violated 
as a result of A's conduct. Now A has done no more than give effect to 
his free choice, and it has been seen that the exercise of free choice is 
justifiable when free enterprise is the ideal that is sought to be promoted. 
But C also pursued his free choice when he entered into employment with 
B. The means used by the law to encourage free enterprise is to say to 
people that if, in pursuit of their aim, they seek to establish relationships 
to their advantage by negotiating and bargaining, the law will help them 
(once the negotiating and bargaining has led to a certain relationship) 
enforce the promises that other people have made to them; that is, once 
the law recognizes that a contract has been formed protection will be given. 
Prima facie, therefore, C ought to be given a cause of action against A, 
because the best way to support the free enterprise model by law is for 
the law to protect free enterprises's ultimate legal product. 
The courts' decisions demonstrate that they have--subconsciously 
perhaps-adopted this policy. In as much as the foregoing discussion of 
the cases has revealed that the courts have made the so-called Lumley v. 
Gye tort apply when breaches of contract have been induced, they have 
been on philosophically sound ground. And not only will the law help a 
promisee to such a contract recover against the inducer of the breach, it 
will also permit him to defend the position he has attained by allowing him 
to interfere with other people's later acquired inconsistent interests. It has 
been seen that the existence of a prior contract permits a promisee to it 
to induce a breach of a subsequent inconsistent contract.82 The courts 
have gone further at times and permitted a promisee to an existing contract 
to induce a breach of a subsequent inconsistent contract even though the 
k s t  promisee acted in defence of a right which his contract did not give 
him. In Short v. The City Bank of Sydney the plaintiff had put his wheat in 
storage with a company which provided free storage. In addition, the 
storage company offered advances to those people who stored wheat 
with it. For these services the company was entitled to a commission on 
any wheat it sold out of storage. In order to make the advances it did 
make the storage company obtained loans from the City Bank of Sydney 
and, by way of security, it gave the Bank, in respect of advances for 
which a loan was obtained, a certificate which said that the company held 
82 Supra, fn. 47, 
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a certain number of bags of wheat which they would deliver to the Bank's 
order on return of the certificates. The plaintiff, as was his right under 
the storage agreement, sold some of the wheat he had given to the company 
for storage and he requested that it be delivered to his purchaser. By then 
the company was in financial difficulties. The plaintiff, whose wheat had 
not been specified when in storage (as was none of the stores' wheat) 
asked that the Bank release its claim on the wheat so that it could be 
consigned as requested. The Bank refused, saying that it had a property 
right in the wheat. The company consequently refused to consign any 
wheat, as it considered that the Bank had proprietary rights over all the 
wheat it held. The plaintiff lost the benefit of his contract for sale and 
sued the Bank. He failed on the basis that all that the Bank did was to 
insist on what it honestly believed its right to be; it had no intention that 
such an insistence should lead to a breach of any particular contract, and 
even though its belief that it had a proprietary interest turned out to be 
wrongly based in law the Bank could not be made liable for the breach of 
contract it caused. Although the holding suggests that perhaps one of 
the reasons for the decision was that the defendant had no intent to 
induce a breach of the contract because it had no knowledge of its 
existence or of its terms, it is difficult to so rationalize the decision as the 
plaintiff had actually written to the Bank, detailing its contract of sale to 
explain its request for the Bank's release of the wheat stored by the 
The fact that to give a cause of action or a right of self-help when a 
breach of contract is induced is justifiable on the basis of the guidelines 
provided does not mean that the principle underlying these guidelines 
requires that every existing contract should attract such protection. Thus 
Sleigh v. BlighP can best be rationalized on the ground that the second 
contract, having been entered into without knowledge of the first (at least 
by the purchaser) was just as good an exercise of free enterprise-and 
therefore deserved as much protection-as the fist, existing contract. 
s.3 (1912) 15 C.L.R. 148. Note also. Blackmore v. Gas Employees' Union (1916) 16 
S.R. (N.S.W.) 323. There a trade union had insisted on the dismissal of an 
employee who had not become a member of the union within the required period. 
This requirement was imposed by an agreement between the union and the 
employer. The dispute had arisen because the dismissed plaintiff was a member of 
another union which had obtained a preference clause in its favour in an award. 
The Court, after some very sophisticated reasoning, came to the conclusion that 
the agreement and the award were not inconsistent because they could both 
operate if a person such as the plaintiff obtained preference and then changed 
his union membership. Hence, the union, having acted bona fide in its own 
interest, was not liable to the plaintiff. Quaere: what would have happened if the 
Court had taken the view that despite its bona fide belief in the legal right it was 
exercising, the union had been wrong? Or if, in Nash v. Copeland (1887)  4 W.N. 
(N.S.W.) 41, the defendant had held the bona fide but mistaken belief that 
Ministers for the Crown had a right to any sleeping berth in which they chose to 
sleep in a government operated train? See also Slattery v. Keirs (1903) 20 W.N. 
(N.S.W.) 45 where such a point was taken but not followed through. 
84 119691 V.R. 931, supra, fn. 49. 
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Indeed, the Court in that case strongly suggested that this was its view, 
even though, with typical judicial restraint, it did not say so expressly. 
Adam J. stated that "on principle" the tort of wrongful interference with 
contractual relations should not be extended to cover cases such as the 
one before him. His Honour continued: 
"Where, as in the case of a contract to purchase property, a purchaser 
being unaware of his vendor's personal obligations under a prior contract 
with another, that party thereby innocently acquired contractual rights 
against his vendor, but subsequently learns that by completing his 
vendor would break his contract with another party, on what rational 
principle is he to be denied his . . . right to insist on completion of his 
own contract? Although no doubt the case may be clearer where the 
subsequent purchaser has no legal escape from his contract, again on 
principle it should make no difference, I consider, that his contract may 
happen to be voidable by him. After all, a voidable contract is valid 
and enforceable, unless, and until avoided at the election of a party 
entitled to avoid it, and why should it be considered an unlawful act on 
his part if, preferring his own contractual rights, he elects to afIirm the 
contract rather than forego them for the benefit of another? In the 
conflict in such a case between the third party's own contractual rights 
lawfully acquired, and those of the plaintiff, on what principle are the 
contractual rights of the plaintiff to be preferred, and the third party's 
action in asserting his own contractual rights to be deemed as unlawful 
acts?s5 
Having discovered no authority for a principle which would make him 
decide otherwise, the learned judge found for the defendant. At no stage 
did he state the principle on which the defendant was legally permitted to 
intentionally induce the breach of the plaintiff's contract, but there can 
be little doubt that it was in fact the principle underlying the guidelines 
proffered in this section. 
That same principle does make it more difficult to base an action where 
the injury to the plaintiff occurs because of some induced commercial 
disappointment, rather than as a result of an induced breach of contract. 
In such a situation it will not be so easy (but not impossible) to establish 
that the free enterprise ideals will be promoted by giving a cause of action 
to the injured party, the less so when the conduct of the defendant might 
itself require protection as being worthwhile conduct in light of the free 
enterprise ideal. This was the difficulty in Independent Oil Industry Limited 
v. The Shell Company of Australia Limited.86 There the plaintiff had had 
an arrangement with retail petrol sellers whereby petrol would be supplied 
by the plaintiff provided that the retailers sold it at a price fixed by the 
plaintiff. The defendants also sold petrol to the same dealers. Their arrange- 
ment was that the retailers had to sell all petrol they sold at a price which 
85 119691 V.R. 931, 936. 
86 (1937) 37 S.R. (N.S.W.) 394. 
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bore a fixed relation to the defendants' price to them; the defendants 
reserved the right not to supply any further petrol whenever the price 
agreement was not honoured. The defendants put up the price of the 
petrol supplied by them; according to the agreement the retailers who 
bought from both the plaintiff and the defendants had to sell both sets of 
petrol at the defendants' new price. But the plaintiff refused to put up the 
price of its petrol. The defendants intimated that they would supply no 
more petrol to non-cooperating dealers, and some dealers then told the 
plaintiff they would sell no more of the plaintiff's fuel. The plaintiff 
brought an action against the defendants for procuring breaches of contract 
and failed. On principle this is supportable: both sets of arrangement 
appear to have been of equivalent merit in terms of the free enterprise 
goals of society and in such a situation it was perhaps best to leave the 
plaintiff with its contractual remedy against the dealers in default.87 The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the plaintiff failed because 
the defendants had not procured the actual breaches. This was so because 
the dealers could legitimately have refused to accept any further supplies 
from the plaintiff because there were no binding contracts in respect of 
such future supplies, merely an understanding that they would continue. 
This way out of the dilemma may have been convenient, but is analytically 
not too convincing. To come to its decision the Court had to make two 
points, neither of which was very persuasive. The .first was that, although 
there were contracts breached in as much as some dealers refused to sell 
petrol at the plaintiff's price although such petrol had already been bought 
by them to sell at this price, the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction 
in respect of such breaches because it would be too difficult to know 
whether such plaintiff petrol had been bought before or after the 
defendants' petrol was affected by the defendants' new pricing policy. The 
second point was that, in any event, all that the defendants had done was 
to declare their intention to enforce their contract; they had not endeav- 
oured to procure breaches. To make a result depend on this kind of 
sophistry is not very satisfactory. 
87 But this is not necessarily so; see below. For an interesting variant see Vickery v. 
Taylor, (1910) 11 S.R. (N.S.W.) 119. The defendant, a director of a company 
had managed to conclude a contract with the plaintiff under which the plaintiff 
agreed to sell 300 shares in the company to the director at any time within SIX 
months that the director might wish to purchase them, such a sale to  be made at 
sixteen shillings a share. The plaintiff had no shares at the time he entered into this 
contract. The defendant subsequently exercised his right under the contract, the 
price of the shares having risen substantially. This meant that the plaintiff had to 
buy the shares at more than sixteen shillings and sell them to the defendant at 
sixteen shillings. The plaintiff alleged that this had happened because the defendant 
and his company had by unethical means caused the share price inflation. The 
Court held he had no cause of action as no right of his had been violated; that IS, 
there had been no procurement of a breach of contract. If the model advocated 
had been used the same result would have been reached on the basis that a 
gambling contract of this nature (it was so described by the Court) did not do 
much for free enterprise and the dubious conduct of the defendant should, despite 
its lack of merit, not be treated as if it was contrary to an important mode of 
conducting business, 
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Although a weighing of the relative merits of the plaintiffs and the 
defendant's enterprises makes it more likely that an existing contract will 
be protected by a cause of action than other kinds of commercial interests, 
it does not follow that only contractual relationships will be protected if 
this test is used. Further, the test does not require that, if it is a contractual 
relationship which the plaintiff wants protected, a breach of the contract 
has been procured by the defendant; an interference with the contractual 
relationship might justify the maintenance of a cause of action in tort. 
And again it is found that the test which it is suggested ought to be applied 
is not very different from the notions that have implicitly governed the 
judiciary's decision-making. Thus there has been liability imposed (without 
acknowledgment that the philosophy of promotion of free enterprise is to 
be promoted by such imposition) where the interference does not amount 
to the procurement of a breach of contractual relations and also where 
there has been an interference with relations which do not amount to a 
contract. 
In Rookes v. Barnardas the House of Lords decided that a certain type 
of conduct which resulted in a contractual relationship being ended legally 
was actionable at the behest of the disappointed contracting party. To 
enable it to do so in the approved manner the House of Lords had to 
rely on precedents which had been ignored for a long time. If the test 
propounded herein had been used much of the bitterness which that 
decision has caused (and is still capable of creating in Australia) could 
have been avoided. Thus, if the question the House of Lords has asked 
itself had been whether or not the causing of injury without breach of 
contract was actionable, (i.e. if the causing of such injury did in fact 
detract from the ultimate goal of the promotion of free enterprise), the 
answer would have been "Yes", but that in the particular circumstances 
of Rookes v. Barnard there would have been no liability because the aim 
of promoting free enterprise was not sufficiently undermined by the conduct 
of the defendants in Rookes v. Barnard when the injury was compared to 
the need for protection of the defendants' conduct. Leaving that for the 
moment, the courts freed by the House of Lords from the straitjacket in 
which they had put themselves, were quick in asserting the principle that 
interferences which did not result in breach of contract could be action- 
able. But because of the formal way that the House of Lords was forced 
to come to its holding, the law has once again become inelastic: bad social 
results may be produced because the courts are not likely to feel themselves 
at liberty to inquire into the social merit of the conduct of the defendant 
in these cases; so far, they have assumed that the defendant's conduct 
will be actionable if it is unlawful.89 
ss [I9641 A.C. 1129. 
s9 Sid Ross Agency Pty. Ltd. v. Actors and Announcers Equity Association o f  
Australia [I9711 1 N.S.W.L.R. 760, where unlawful picketing causing the plaintiff 
not to enter into further contracts with the plaintiff was held actionable. The trade 
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As to the other point, it has already been seen that the law gives a 
remedy if the tort of passing-off is committed, that is, although the plaintiff 
cannot complain of either a breach of or interference with an enforceable 
contract, he does complain of lost business opportunities. In the proposed 
formula's jargon, he complains that the interference with his interest will, 
if not deterred, detract from the law's efforts to promote free enterprise in 
society. The position that the plaintiff wishes to have protected by an 
action, he will argue, he has only achieved after participating in free 
enterprise activities as society and the law would have him do; accordingly 
he deserves the help of the law against interferers who seek to gain a 
benefit from his work without having participated in free enterprise in the 
same useful way. Once again it may be noted that our courts have acted in 
accordance with some such notions. It is no accident, surely, that the 
defences available in passing-off actions are in fact defences which promote 
free competition. Hence, if a person uses his oam name which is the same 
or similar to the name used by another who is already associated with a 
particular product, he will not be liable in passing-off because he must be 
encouraged to enter into business; the wrong is committed only if he uses 
the name in order to profit from the goodwill another's efforts have 
obtained for him. The motive of the defendant is, therefore, determinative 
of liability?O 
Another area that the courts have been forced to handle illogically 
because of their adherence to the contract-oriented formula is created by 
the following kind of circumstance. Assume that A has heard that B has 
contracted to deliver a certain number of power points to C, and A for 
business reasons, does not want C to reap the benefit of this contract. A 
buys up all the available power points on the market, knowing full well 
that B will consequently not be able to discharge his obligation to C. 
Should the law protect C by giving him a cause of action against A? 
The free enterprise promotion formulation does not make the answer to 
this question obvious: it may or may not be to the advantage of free 
enterprise to permit A to corner the market to this extent. A great many 
more facts would have to be known to make that decision, and a resolution 
union motive for so attacking the plaintiffs business was not the subject of judicial 
argument. In J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley, 119651 A.C. 269, unlawful acts 
procuring breaches of contract and which also interfered with future business 
dealings of the plaintiff were held actionable in respect of both sets of injuries. 
90 Jay's Limited v. Jacobi [I9331 Ch. 411. There have been some commentators who 
have doubted whether the plaintiff and defendant actually have to be in competi- 
tion; see D. L. Mathieson, (1961) 39 Can. B. Rev. 409, and C. L. Pannam, 
"Unauthorized Use of Names or Photographs in Advertisements" (1966) 40 A.L.J. 
4, but these writers argue that pecuniary loss needs to be shown. That is, if the 
plaintiff can show that the use of his name, likeness, "get-up" or whatever, could, 
if used by himself, net him a profit, he may recover although he can show no 
loss of business or that he was in competition with the defendant in any real 
sense; see Henderson v. Radio Corporation Pty. Ltd. (1960) 60 S.R. (N.S.W.) 576. 
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without argument or evidence, that A should be enabled to forestall C, 
have mowed the law relating to inducing breaches of contract by holding 
that an indirect inducement of a breach of contract will not be actionable 
unless the defendant's conduct was unlawful.92 But an unlawful act which 
of the problem would differ in differing times?l The courts, assuming, 
interferes with a contract may often not be as inimical to the aims of free 
enterprise as a lawful act which so interferes. This will be especially so 
where the unlawful act in fact furthers another acceptable social objective 
such as the viability of a trade union. 
It is natural enough that the courts, in cases of an indirect procurement 
of a breach of contract, have reached for a "neutral" criterion such an 
unlawful act being determinative of actionability. In this way they have 
had to make no comparison between the value the law places on the 
protection of the contract and any value it might place on the conduct of 
the defendant. They merely have had to see whether a contract was 
breached as a result of the defendant's unlawful act. And in most cases 
this will bring the same result as the balancing test proposed. Typically, 
if A physically restrains B from delivering goods to C so that C cannot 
perform his contract with D, which result A wished to achieve when he 
restrained B, there can be no doubt but that this kind of interference ought 
to be actionable on the "promotion of free enterprise" test. It is, of course, 
actionable on the "unlawful act indirectly procuring a breach of contract" 
test?3 But it goes too far to say, as Jenkins L.J. said in Thomson v. Deakin 
that there is 
"no distinction in principle for the present purpose between persuading 
a man to break his contract with another, preventing him by physical 
restraint from performing it, making his performance of it impossible by 
taking away or damaging his tools or machinery, and making his per- 
formance of it impossible by depriving him, in breach of their contracts, 
of the services of his employees."* 
In this section the suggestion, so far, has been that the test the courts 
ought to use is whether or not the plaintiff's interest is worthy of protection 
because it is an interest consonant with the aims of free enterprise and, if 
91 For instance, in mediaeval England it was thought intolerable that dealers and 
middlemen should manipulate supplies in order to artificially inflate prices. Prices 
were regulated and there were strict laws against the practices of engrossing, 
forestalling and regrading: See E. Lipson-The Economic History of  England 
(9th ed.) pp. 299-307. As this tolerance to "free market" operations waxes and 
wanes, the result of the hypothetical case will vary if the kind of test advocated 
herein is utilized. 
92 D. C .  Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin 119521 Ch. 646. The example used in the 
text is taken from the judgment of Lord Evershed M.R., at 680. 
93 Williams v. Hursey (1959) 103 C.L.R. 30 in which physical force was used to 
stop the plaintiffs to enter into contracts. See also Keogh v. The Australian 
Workers' Union (1902) 2 S.R. (N.S.W.) 265 where unionists waylaid non-unionists 
who were on their way to take up employment with an employer with whom the 
union were disputing. 
94 [I9521 Ch. 646, 696. 
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it is, whether or not the defendant's conduct deserves to be sanctioned 
because it does not further those aims as well as does the plaintiff's 
enterprise. But there was a qualification added to the basic guidelines, 
namely that the law is expected to uphold the free enterprise creed "in as 
much as it does not conflict with other known social objectives". There are 
other social objectives which the law is to protect and uphold and hence 
Jenkins L.J. overstated the case when he said that the means of indirect 
interference with a contract was of no consequence as long as it was 
unlawful. Just as the promotion of free enterprise requires that non- 
contractual as well as contractual relationships ought to be protected, it 
will be necessary to protect certain kinds of conduct even if they could be 
detrimental to efforts to promote the free enterprise ideal. 
The courts recognize this need and have permitted the defence of 
justification or privilege to succeed in circumstances where there has been 
an intentional procurement of a breach of contract. I t  has been seen that 
a father may advise his daughter to break her promise to marry with 
impunity. Sometimes it is sought to demonstrate that this is not an attempt 
by the courts to inquire into the motive for, and reasonableness of, the 
conduct of the inducer at all; after all, if the courts did openly engage in 
such inquiries, tortious liability would not depend on such objective 
criteria as "breach of contract" or "unlawful act". Thus, Salmond argues 
that there is a difference between advising and inducing. For a father to 
advise his daughter not to marry a person to whom she is contractually 
bound so to do is not actionable if she heeds his advice, for he merely gave 
her reasons, which already existed, for breaking the contract. An induce- 
ment differs in that the inducer creates reasons to cause another to break 
a con t ra~ t .~Wi th  e greatest of respect, this line of argument cannot be 
accepted. As Willes C.J. said as far back as 1745 " 'procuring' is certainly 
'persuading with effect' ".96 The result cannot turn on the manner in which 
the defendant caused another person to break a contract; as long as he 
intentionally caused the contract to be breached, one of the elements of 
the tort is made Whether or not liability ought to follow ought to 
depend on other factors, in particular, on the social merit of the advisor's/ 
inducer's conduct. 
Similarly, the courts have determined that a defendant will be justified 
in inducing a breach of contract where his conduct was lawful in the sense 
9"almond on the Law of  Torts, op. cit. p. 379. 
96 Winsmore V. Greenbank (1745) 125 E.R. 1330, 1332. 
97 See also Payne, "The Tort of Interference with Contract" (1954) 7 Curr. L. Probs. 94. 
As the author says at p. 103: "Moreover, if the distinction between inducement 
and advice is accepted, what is to be said of the mere advisor who, though he 
does not threaten the person advised or actually created new reasons for the 
breach he advocates, is nevertheless in a position to visit his displeasure upon the 
person advised should his advice not be followed. If causation can in fact be shown 
responsibility should follow." Yet the courts have drawn the distinction between 
advice and inducement from time to time. Contrast Thomson v. Deakin [I9521 
Ch. 646 with Stratford v. Lindley [I9651 A.C. 269 on this point. 
Lumley v. Gye-The Aftermath 
of having been engaged in under the umbrella of statutory authority. James 
v. The Commonwealthg8 is an illustration of this attitude. It is worth 
pointing out that the action of inducing a breach of contract is made out 
when the defendant's act is the direct inducement of the breach even 
though the defendant's act is otherwise lawful. That is, statutory authority 
ought not to differentiate this lawful act from other lawful acts which are 
actionable. Therefore it may be concluded that the courts (in cases like 
James v. The Commonwealth) are making a judgment that the defendant's 
reliance on a positive enactment of the law indicates that he acted in 
furtherance of a social objective which may be assumed to be at least as 
worthy of protection as the plaintiff's contract or commercial interest. That 
is, they are balancing social objectives. 
And again, in cases like Brimelow v. Casson the defendant was excused 
because of the plaintiff's exploitation of his employees, but in the 
G h o r g a n  Miners' case the union's attempt to look after employees' 
interest was held not to be justified. This has brought the sharp comment 
from Professor Wedderburn that "[s]exual corruption 'justifies' inducing 
breach; but starvation wages alone would not".99 And the reason for this 
anomaly is clear: because the courts do not openly apply a balancing test, it 
is potluck whether or not the defendant's interest and conduct will be held 
to have been worthwhile. Thus, the social objective is supporting trade 
unions in their activities is not brought into the balance when weighed 
against the plaintiff's commercial interest, or if it is, it is often found to be 
of little countervailing weight, because the failure to openly apply this 
balancing test permits courts to ignore important social evidence. If the 
plaintiff's commercial interest, however, is tainted by being associated 
with conduct which the courts recognize as something the law clearly will 
not support, e.g. causing girls to live "in immorality with a dwarf", then 
the balance is weighed in favour of trade union-type activity. This brings 
us to the point that all articles on inducing a breach of contract must 
eventually discuss: the r61e this area of tort has played in industrial 
relations. 
The judicial approach to industrial law has often and excellently been 
detailed by many writers and it would be superfluous to deal with it again 
in this brief space.lW Suffice it to say that trade unionism was seen as a 
98 (1939) 62 C.L.R. 339, above at tgn 43. See also Williams v. Metropolitan & 
Export Abbatoirs Board (1953)  89 C.L.R. 66; Stott v. Gamble 119161 2 K.B. 504, 
and see Whitfeld v. De Laurent & Co. Ltd. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71 where ~t was 
held that, where a State government wheat scheme indirectly prevented shippers 
from obtaining a carrying permit from the Commonwealth, the State government 
had not caused the loss of which the plaintiff complained. But that, on general 
principles, evidence as to what would happen to the wheat crop if the State had 
not put its scheme into operation could be given as tending to establish reasonable 
cause or excuse for doing the acts complained of. 
99 K. W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (2nd ed. London: Macgibbon and 
Kee) p.350. 
100 Citrine's Trade Union Law (3rd ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell 1967); 
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social evil by both legislature and judiciary in England until the early part 
of the nineteenth century. Then the legislature came to recognize that 
trade union activity served some accepted social purpose and gave trade 
unions some legal protection. The judiciary assumed that, in as much as 
the legislature had not expressly given protection, trade union activity was 
still to be discouraged and they made trade unions liable for engaging in 
their collective conduct. The legislature, bit by bit, overcame these legal 
barriers to full-blooded trade union activity and, by 1906, the trade 
unions were expressly protected from all known tortious causes of acting 
which could be used against them.lOl Note that the legislature insisted that 
this protection only be provided when the social objectives of the trade 
union conduct which led to the plaintiff's injury was of a particular type, 
namely when it went to enhance the trade union cause in furtherance of 
a trade dispute. That is, the courts were being told quite specifically that 
there was a certain kind of social objective which was more worthy of 
support than the promotion of competitive enterprise. Where the legislation 
had not offered its express protection, the courts restricted trade union 
activity considerably. After Allen v. Flood, as has been seen, to act to 
the detriment of another was not actionable, even if the harm was intended. 
Apparently an independent, unlawful act had to be committed. In Quinn 
v. Leathemlo2 it was held that, if otherwise lawful acts by a trade unionist 
were committed in concert with other individual trade unionists, these 
lawful acts were translated into actionable conduct. The tort was known as 
a civil conspiracy. This contrasted strangely with the decision in Mogul 
Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Grow & Co.lo3 where it was held that busi- 
nessmen's concerted action, consisting of lawful acts, taken to protect 
their competitive interests was not actionable at the behest of an individual 
competitor who was intentionally injured by the combined activity of the 
other businessmen. The cases are only distinguishable on the basis that 
the social objective of the trade union in Quinn v. Leathem was not 
acknowledged to be worthy of legal support, whereas the free enterprisers' 
aims in Mogul were. As time went by and the legislature in England made 
it clear that combined activity of trade unions in certain contexts was 
C. Grunfeld, Modern Trade Union Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell 1966); 
K .  W.  Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, op. cit.; E. I .  Sykes, Strike Law in 
Australia (Sydney: Law Book Co. 1960); E.  I .  Sykes and H .  J .  Glasbeek, Labour 
Law in Australia (Sydney: Butterworths 1972); are but a few of  the texts which 
have dealt with this topic at length. 
101 Highlights o f  this development included the Combination Acts of  1799 and 
1800-1839 Geo. 3 C. 81 and 39 & 40 Geo. 3. C. 106; partially repealing statutes 
of  1824-1825, 5 Geo. 4., C. 95, 6 Geo, 4, C .  119: cases like Hornby v. Close 
(1867) 2 Q.B. 153, Walsby v. Anley (1861) 3 E. & E. 516, R. v. Rowlands 
(1851) 5 Cox C.C. 466; Royal Commission on Trade Unions 1867, 1871-1876 
statutes-Trade Union Acts, 39 & 40 Vict., C. 22; Tag Vale Railway v .  Amalga- 
mated Society of Railway Servants [I9011 A.C. 426, Trade Disputes Act 1906. 
102 [1901] A.C. 495. 
i03 [I8921 A.C. 25. 
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socially acceptable, the courts came to terms with this attitude. Thus in 
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch,loP the House of Lords 
held that, if the trade union's reason for collective action was to further 
its own legitimate interests, the trade union could not be liable in tort for 
any injury it had intentionally inflicted by such combination. This formula 
recognized that trade unions had legitimate interests to further and it 
required the courts to inquire into the motive of the defendants. The 
balancing between promoting the plaintiff's right to trade against the 
desirability of certain kinds of trade union activity was, in this context at 
least, openly condoned. But the judiciary refrained from taking this 
approach to its logical conclusion. It is still the law that if the combiners 
commit independently unlawful acts no further inquiry into the social 
desirability of their combination will be made; it will be actionable if it 
causes injury. The underlying reason for this is that if the acts are 
unlawful in themselves they must be socially undesirable. Such arbitrary 
line-drawing is not very appealing to those who would like the legal system 
to attain a measure of justice when resolving disputes. 
Let us return to the main theme. The very brief discussion of the 
development of trade union law in England demonstrates how the courts 
had accepted the promotion of free enterprise as worthy of legal support 
but at no stage willingly accepted the furtherance of trade union aims as 
being so worthy. How did Lumley v. Gye and its offspring fare in the 
industrial relations' area? 
When the 1906 Trade Disputes Act was passed it contained a clause 
making inducement of a breach of contract or any other interference with 
the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right 
of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wished, 
not actionable provided that such inducement or interference occurred in 
the furtherance of a trade dispute.lo5 This clear expression of parliamentary 
will made trade unions safe from harassment by actions in Lumley v. Gye. 
But, as has been seen, in Rookes v. BarnardlOB the House of Lords 
reached back and found that there was a cause of action analogous, but 
not quite the same, as inducement of a breach of contract. They called it 
the tort of intimidation and held that it was made out when a threat of 
an unlawful act intentionally caused interference with another's interests, 
regardless of whether or not that other's interest was a breach of contract 
or not. This made it both more limited (in that it required an unlawful 
act) and wider than the tort of inducing a breach of contract (in that it 
required no breach of contract), these differences permitting the House of 
Lords to say that the statutory protection did not apply. The House of 
1m [I9421 A.C. 435. 
105 S. 3, Trade Disputes Act 1906 (U.K.). 
108 El9641 A.C. 1129; see supra at p. 219. 
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Lords ignored the second limb of the statutory protection by reading it as 
surplusage. 
The case has been much discussed and criticized, and very often the 
criticism takes the form of alleging that the House of Lords' bias against 
trade unionism caused it to invent brand new tort liability.lo7 This is not 
easily proved, but what can be shown is that the ability of courts to hide 
behind rationalization techniques enables them to achieve results which the 
open application of a balancing test would not permit them to do. Thus, 
part of the burden of this article is that there always was a general cause of 
action of interference with trade and like interests, and that the restriction 
of Lumley v. Gye as a cause of action to the inducement of breaches of 
contracts was historically erroneous and wrong in principle. In Rookes v. 
Barnard the House of Lords reached back to the general cause of action, 
but feeling itself bound to do so in the normal judicial manner, it created 
profound discontent. 
The courts, prior to Rookes v. Barnard, had reduced the various forms 
of tortious liability to specific verbal formulae. The precedent theory gave 
these formulations the status of unchallengeable rules: if the criteria spelt 
out were established, liability would ensue; it was not the courts' task to 
look behind the criteria and seek to satisfy social needs. That, so went 
(and goes) the theory, was the legislature's function. The legislature, in 
fact, responded by giving protection against the whole of the range of 
actions that the verbal formulae had made available against trade unions 
and which, if the theory of precedent was honoured, delimited the possible 
causes of action. Then the House of Lords held that the legislature had 
not covered all contingencies because the known verbal formulations had 
not exhaustedly listed all the contingencies. The House of Lords was right 
in its finding that there was an historical base for its decision, but the law 
was once again seen as being far from evenhanded. There would have been 
no, or considerably less, furore if the unlawful act threatened in Rookes v. 
Barnard had been that the employer's machinery would be smashed, or 
management members attacked unless the offending non-unionist employees 
were dismissed. But, in fact, the unlawful act threatened was to break the 
contract of employment two of the defendants had with the employer by 
striking in defiance of a term of their employment contract. If the balancing 
107 Professor Wedderburn has contributed a great deal to the discussion, see, "The 
Right to Threaten Strikes" (1961) 24 M.L.R. 572; "The Right to %reaten Strikes 
11" (1962) 25 M.L.R. 513; "Intimidation and the Right to S e e "  (1964) 27 
M.L.R. 257 and also in the text The Worker and the Law, op. crt. Other com- 
mentaries include Hamson, "A Note on Rookes v. Barnard" [I9611 C.L.J. 159; 
Weir, "Rookes, Stratford and the Economic Torts" [I9641 C.L.J. 225; Cameron, 
"Conspiracy and Intimidation, An Anti-Metaphysical Approach" (1965) 28 M.L.R. 
448; Smith, "Rookes v. Barnard. An Upheaval in the Common Law Relatmg to 
Industrial Disputes" (1966) 40 A.L.J. 81; Hoffman, "Rookes v. Barnard" (1965) 
81 L.Q.R. 116, (who also adopts the stance that intimidation is part of an old 
and wider action) ; Thomson (1963) 41 Can. Bar Rev. 110. 
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test suggested herein had been used, the House of Lords could not possibly 
have made the decision it did make in Rookes v. Barnard. 
As a matter of logic there is nothing wrong in regarding a breach of 
contract as an unlawful act, but what is wrong is to regard the cause of 
action now known as intimidation as being founded irrespective of the 
nature of the unlawful act. As has been seen, inducements of breaches of 
contract intentionally procured have been held non-actionable by courts 
where they felt the defendant's conduct was justifiable. The failure to 
assess the social merits of the defendants threat to breach their contract in 
Rookes v. Barnard shows that the House of Lords either did not believe 
that trade union aims were worthy of legal support over and above that 
already given by legislation, or else it believed that the cause of action 
it had discovered was so well-established that a court could not inquire 
into the social effects a literal application of the verbal formula it had 
just devised would have. But the literal approach cannot be maintained for 
long by the judiciary in any given area because such rigidity inevitably puts 
the law out of step with social desires.lo8 The House of Lords made it 
virtually impossible by its decision in Rookes v. Barnard, for trade unions 
to threaten to call a strike, a weapon that it is essential for trade unionists 
to have and the legislature decided not to wait for the courts to invent 
qualifications to the tort of intimidation.lm 
For another instance of how, in recent years, the courts' theoretical 
belief that they need to adhere to verbal formulae without inquiring into 
the social merit of people's conduct can cause the legal system to become 
anti-social let us consider the short history of Daily Mirror v. Gwdner'lo 
in the industrial relations' area. In that case, Lord Denning, as the House 
of Lords had done in Rookes v. Barnard, thought that the tort of inducing 
a breach of contract was but a manifestation of a general principle of 
liability. In particular, he thought that Thomson v. Deakin had stated the 
law too narrowly when it was decreed there that an indirect inducement of 
a breach of contract would only be actionable if the defendant's act was 
independently unlawful. His Lordship said: 
"It seems to me that if anyone procures or induces a breach of contract, 
whether by direct approach to the one who breaks the contract or by 
indirect influence through others, he is acting unlawfully if there be no 
sufficient justification for the interference."lll 
10s Hence the development of defences like justification and the requirement that 
where there is an indirect inducement of a breach of contract the defendant's act 
will not be actionable unless it was independently unlawful. 
109 The legislature stepped in and partially relieved the position, indicating that the 
social objectives of trade unionism as practised in Rookes v. Barnard were accept- 
able to the public-Trade Disputes Act 1965. 
llo [I9681 2 Q.B. 762. 
111 119681 2 Q.B. 762, 781. 
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But in Torquay Hotel v. Cousins,l12 as has been seen,l13 Lord Denning, 
faced with a trade union's indirect procurement of interference with com- 
mercial relations held that he must have been wrong in the Daily Mirror 
case. He thought that he must have been wrong because if he had not 
been wrong trade union officials would be prevented from calling strikes, 
even lawful ones, because these strikes would always lead to some breach 
of contract. This was an unacceptable thought. Hence Lord Denning said 
that his verbal formulation had gone too far in opening up liability in 
Daily Mirror v. Gardner.l14 It is interesting to note that Lord Denning 
held himself to be wrong in law because of the results that might ensue 
from a literal application of his words appalled him. Yet his Lordship did 
not have to castigate himself so harshly. As has been seen, liability ought 
not to depend on the arbitrary distinction between the legality or otherwise 
of the defendant's act; a lack of legality may be good evidence that the 
defendant's conduct promoted an anti-social aim,l15 but it ought not be 
conclusive on this issue and it is this issue-of whether or not the 
defendant's conduct was anti-social-which ought to be determinative of 
liability. After all, Lord Denning finished the passage quoted with the 
qualifying phrase "if there be no sufficient justification for interference", 
which meant that not all procurements or inducements ought to be 
actionable. By rejecting the Daily Mirror formulation he freed trade 
unions' conduct from some harassment where their procurement of a 
breach of contract was indirect, but he emphasized that unlawful induce- 
ment and procurements would lead to liability regardless of the nature of 
the unlawful act or the motive for doing it. That is, although Lord Denning 
saw the need for protecting some kinds of conduct at the expense of the 
free enterprise goals of society as promoted by the making of contracts, he 
did not feel free to say that a balancing on the basis of social evidence ought 
to occur in such cases. Rather he put his faith in a categorization of the 
kind which had led to the unpalatable result in Rookes v. Barnard. 
In the same way Lord Denning had to retrace his steps in Morgan v. 
Fry.l16 In Stratford v. Lindleyn7 Lord Denning himself had said that 
whenever men gave notice that they were going to go on strike, they were 
giving notice that they were going to break their contracts. This was so 
because they intended to pressurize their employer by threatening to not 
honour their contractual obligation to work but did not intend to resign. 
This meant that when a strike was threatened, an unlawful act was 
112 [I9691 2 Ch. 106. 
113 Supra, p. 202. 
114 His Lordship also suggested that the procurement of a breach of contract in 
Daily Mirror had been the direct result of the defendant's conduct and that, 
therefore, the result had been sound, even if his dictum had not been. 
116 Just as lack of an enforceable contract will be good evidence that the plaintiffs 
interest should be upheld because its support promotes a socially desirable aim. 
116 [I9681 2 Q.B. 710. 
117 [I9651 A.C. 269. 
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threatened, (for although inducing a breach of contract was not actionable 
because of the statute, it was still unlawful) and, therefore, actionable 
intimidation had taken place if there was a violation of the plainws interest. 
In Morgan v. Fry Lord Denning said that it was "difficult to see the logical 
flaw in that argument. But there must be something wrong with it: for . . . 
it would do away with the right to strike in this country."118 He then went 
on to hold that, as the strike notice was lawful in the case before him, no 
unlawful act had been threatened. Further, Lord Denning suggested that 
proper notice of a strike was merely a notice to suspend the contract. This 
is wrong in principle. As Professor Sykes has said "If all socio-political 
reasoning inducing legal phenomena has to have some front of lawyers' 
reasoning, here the front becomes the merest facade"?lg But the adoption 
of this "front of lawyers' reasoning" enabled Lord Denning to come to the 
right result without openly using the kind of balancing test of the kind 
offered in this article. 
In England the heat has momentarily been taken out of the common law 
debate. In 1971 the Industrial Relations Act took away from unregistered 
trade unions the legislative protection previously granted against actions 
in conspiracy and inducing breach of contract, but all registered trade 
unions were to have immunity against all possible common law actions, 
provided that they had acted in furtherance of an industrial dispute as 
deiined in the Act. That is, the legislature clearly said to the courts: for 
unregistered trade unions to act in a particular way is anti-social and you 
must deter them; for registered trade unions so to act during industrial dis- 
putes is a desirable form of conduct and you must leave them alone. The 
balancing had been done by statute. In 1974 a Labor government came 
to power and has stated that it will repeal the Industrial Relations Act 
of 1971 and in its place extend the former legislative protection (and more) 
to trade unions. Past experience should make the legislature wary about 
how to draft this legislation. 
Whatever the position in England is to become, Australia is, and will 
remain for the foreseeable future, a dramatic example of how much out 
of step a legal system can get with social requirements when the judiciary 
does not accept the responsibility of inquiring into the relative social merit 
of the plaintiff's and defendant's enterprise and conduct. This is so because 
only Queensland of all the states in Australia has extended the legislative 
protection afforded to English trade unions by the Trade Disputes Act 
1906. In all the other states trade unions are wide open to actions in 
conspiracy and inducing breach of contract. As the Australian judiciary 
has accepted the law as stated in England and uses the same technique, 
(namely, merely looks to see whether the technical requirements of the 
'18 119681 2 Q.B. 710, 725. 
119 Sykes & Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia, op. cit. p. 353, 
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tort are fulfilled), it would be very easy to completely hamstring all union 
activity. The more so because in all states but Victoria strikes are made 
illegal to a greater or lesser extent by statute. And, at federal level, strike 
action may be made a breach of an award by the insertion of a bans 
clause. That is, the unlawful act necessary to found conspiracy by unlawful 
means, indirect inducement of breach of contract and intimidation will be 
easily established.120 
To merely inquire into whether or not the technical criteria have been 
established is particularly short-sighted in the Australian context. For the 
judiciary could hardly be furnished with more evidence than is available 
to come to the view that trade union activity is very much desired by our 
community. Thus, at the federal level, registration of trade unions has 
been encouraged to such a marked degree that we have become one of 
the most unionized countries in the world. These unions are required 
because the industrial relations' system we have developed is dependent on 
having entities which can be made parties to enforceable, imposed awards. 
At the same time we urge the participants in industrial relations to 
collectively bargain. This necessitates the use by these participants of 
economic force and thus, by trade unions, cd conspiring to hurt the 
employer and to induce breaches of his contracts or generally to interfere 
with his commercial interests. Four of the states have systems analogous 
to the federal one and in the remaining two, Victoria and Tasmania, the 
role of trade unions is also seen as significant. That is, right along the line 
there is, for everyone to see, an encouragement to trade unions to make 
themselves stronger numerically and to use their power to withhold labour 
when engaging in the desirable activity of bargaining. 
In this framework it is difficult to applaud courts for just looking at a 
dispute between a trade union and an employer as if it were a dispute 
which can simply be symbolized by using letters as substitutes for the 
parties involved, disregarding the characters of the disputants. That is, if 
a union seeks to make an employer employ trade unionists only, an aim 
that is in keeping with the encouragement of trade unionism, it is simply 
not good enough to say that this is a dispute between A who persuaded B 
not to perform his contract with C unless D dismissed X, and that, where 
A used unlawful means, he will be liable in tort on one of several counts 
(conspiracy if A is more than one, intimidation or inducement of breach 
of contract). The question ought to be whether the union's aim is a 
desirable one, and if so, whether the means used to achieve if were of the 
kind which ought to be protected from legal action, taking into account 
the need to protect the rights violated. But the courts will not do this, as 
the recent case of Woolley v. Dunsf0r61~l demonstrates. There a decision 
" See generally Sykes & Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia, op. cit.; Sykes, Strike 
Law in Australia, op .  cit. 
119721 3 S.A.S.R. 243. 
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was made that the union, by imposing a black ban on an employer's goods 
in order to cause that employer to get his employees to join the union, 
had induced a breach of contract. The employer's contracts were breached 
because a shipping company refused to handle his wool when informed of 
the black ban. An order was made against the union. Most of the report 
of the case is made up by the Court's careful evaluation of mountains of 
evidence about whether the defendant's conduct caused the shipping 
company to breach the contract and whether or not there was a contract. 
It is suggested that it would not have been any more arduous for the court 
to take the position that the decision should be made on the basis of the 
relative merits of the enterprise and conduct of the parties, the social value 
of the trade union activity being well-documented and other relevant social 
evidence being readily a~ailab1e.l~~ 
A brief point is to be made in respect of the earlier comment that if 
the judicial approach presently employed persists, the position will not 
alter. This will be so despite the present federal government's announced 
intention to provide protection on the English legislative model basis.lz3 
Even if such legislation is enacted, and even if it is held to be constitution- 
ally it will apply to federally registered trade unions acting in the 
federal sphere of labour regulation. At the State level, no immunity will 
have been created. 
Should the courts be permitted to consider the difficulties arising out of 
the use of power by trade unions as if they were no different from the 
actions of an individual who, for private gain or malice, seeks to interfere 
with the legitimate interests of another? Is the value of having the judicial 
system appear to be bound by rules and, therefore, objective, not out- 
weighed by the inevitable creation of the kinds of problems outlined in 
this section if this judicial method is adopted? 
A Summation 
1. The courts should be asked to strike a balance between competing 
interests on the basis of the social desirability of those aims. An acceptable 
starting point at this moment in time is that endeavours which promote 
free enterprise activity should be supported by the law by imposing liability 
on those who interfere with such endeavours. It follows that, although the 
existence of a contract will be strong evidence that the plaintiff's interest 
122 Other cases which were decided by artificial criteria included McKernan v. 
Fraser, Bond v. Morris and Williams v. Hursey, discussed supra. In all three 
cases the court spent a good deal of time discussing whether or not it was a 
contract which had been interfered with. 
12-3 In 1973 such legislation was offered but was not passed into legislation. 
124 It can only be valid if it is adjudged incidental to the power of conciliation and 
arbitration. The registration of trade unions is permissible as being incidental to 
that power, that is, to make implementation of that power more efficient. Quaere: 
whether the granting of immunity to tort actions in order to make registered 
trade unions more efficient is incidental (within the meaning of the Constitution) 
to the conciliation and arbitration power, 
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should be protected, not only contractual interests will be protected, nor 
will actual breaches of contract be necessary. In any event, the Lumley V. 
Gye "tort" has been wrongly restricted to inducing breaches of contract. 
2. Not all interferences with endeavours which promote free enterprise 
should attract liability. There should be no such liability if the interference 
is the natural result of the promotion of a socially desirable aim. The 
courts will need to obtain evidence to enable them to decide between the 
relative desirability of the two conflicting aims. Whether or not the 
interference is the result of an independently unlawful activity is not 
determinative of this issue; but if the conduct is truly reprehensible, e.g., 
the use of violence to achieve a socially desirable aim, this must be taken 
into account in applying the balancing test. 
3. The courts have clearly accepted that endeavours which promote free 
enterprise are worthy of being protected by the law especially by making an 
action available where there is no inducement of a breach of contract. 
They have also recognized that some countervailing objectives may override 
such protection. In view of this it can legitimately be said that they assume 
certain social facts and desiderata when facing the kinds of dispute dis- 
cussed in this article. It is therefore not legitimate to argue that they 
should not take their position to its logical conclusion; nor should they be 
permitted to continue to hide behind the pretence that only the legislature 
can and does build policy into the law. 
4. There is no question but that to balance competing interests and 
codicting social aims will be very difficult. It will be difficult to get the 
right kind of evidence before the courts. For example, it was seen that 
in Independent Oil Industries Ltd. v. The Shell Co. of Australia Ltd.125 
there was no convincing reason why either one of the parties should be 
favoured on policy basis. But this is no reason for saying that the courts 
should decide cases without regard to policy reasoning of the kind 
advocated. If they do so, the results will only look more objectively 
reached; they will not be more objective, nor more just. To say that it is 
not proper for the courts to delve into social data is to say that the lady 
who represents justice is blind-folded because she wants to make her 
decisions in ignorance, rather than by treating disputes on their real merits. 
This is not a new-fangled thesis advocated only by academics who do 
not have to deal with the realities of administering a legal system. It was 
stated, much better than I have been able to do it, eighty years ago, by 
one of the greatest common law judges of all times. Thus spoke Oliver 
Wendell Holmes : 
"But whether, and how far, a privilege shall be allowed is a question of 
policy. Questions of policy are legislative questions, and judges are shy 
of reasoning from such grounds. Therefore, decisions for or against the 
125 (1937) 37 S.R. (N.S.W.) 394. 
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privilege, which really can stand only upon such grounds, often are 
presented as hollow deductions from empty general propositions like 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which teaches nothing but a 
benevolent yearning, or else are put as if they themselves embodied a 
postulate of the law and admitted of no further deduction. . . . When the 
question of policy is faced it will be seen to be one which cannot be 
answered by generalities, but must be determined by the particular 
character of the case. . . . I do not try to mention or to generalize all 
the facts which have to be taken into account; but plainly the worth 
of the result, or the gain from allowing the act to be done, has to be 
compared with the loss which it inflicts. Therefore, the conclusion will 
vary, and will depend on different reasons according to the nature of 
the 
"6 Q. W. Hdmes, "Privilege, Malice and Intent" (1894) 8 Harv. L.R. 13. 
